The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects by Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs
STEVEN  RADELET 
Harvard Institute  for International Development 
JEFFREY  D.  SACHS 
Harvard Institute  for International Development 
The East Asian Financial  Crisis: 
Diagnosis,  Remedies,  Prospects 
"HISTORY,"  JAWAHARLAL  NEHRU  famously  observed,  "is  almost  al- 
ways written by the victors. " I Financial history, it seems,  is written by 
the creditors.  When a financial crisis  arises,  it is the debtors who  are 
asked to take the blame.  This is odd, since a loan agreement invariably 
has two parties. The failure of a loan usually represents miscalculations 
on both sides  of  the transaction or distortions  in the lending  process 
itself. 
The East Asian financial crisis has so far been true to form. As soon 
as the crisis  hit in mid-1997,  the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which led the official  international response,  assigned  primary respon- 
sibility  to the shortcomings  of East Asian capitalism,  in particular, the 
East Asian financial markets. The IMF's principal strategy for the three 
countries hardest hit-Indonesia,  Korea,  and Thailand-was  to over- 
haul their financial systems.  The basic diagnosis  was that East Asia had 
exposed  itself  to  financial  chaos  because  its  financial  systems  were 
riddled by insider dealing,  corruption, and weak corporate governance, 
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which,  in  turn,  had  led  to  inefficient  investment  spending  and  had 
weakened  the stability of the banking system. 
There is some truth in such claims.  And yet the hypothesis  that East 
Asia's  financial shortcomings  alone caused the crisis and fully explain 
its depth fits uncomfortably with several important facts.  First, the East 
Asian economies  had been highly  successful  for a generation,  belying 
the notion of fatally dysfunctional  economies.  Second,  the 1997 crisis 
was largely unanticipated,  a point which also seems  to be at odds with 
allegations  of the long-standing  ills of these economies.  A few voices, 
notably  Yung  Chul Park in Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 
had warned that East Asia  could be subject to the same kind of crisis 
that had  hit  Mexico  in  1994-95,  but  they  were  rare and  generally 
unheeded.2 And even though many observers saw some danger signs in 
late  1996-for  example,  in the overvaluation  of  the Thai baht-they 
did not anticipate  the kind of  financial  meltdown  that has in fact  oc- 
curred.  Third,  and related  to  the  first two  points,  foreign  investors 
flooded the region with funds until the onset of the crisis. 
Why,  then,  have the East Asian  economies  temporarily collapsed? 
The magnitude and suddenness of the financial reversal are made clear 
in table  1, which records net capital flows to the five East Asian crisis 
economies:  Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  the Philippines,  and Thailand. 
Private net  inflows  to  these  five  countries  soared,  rising  from  $40.5 
billion  in 1994 to $93.0  billion  in 1996.  But in 1997 the long period of 
inflow  abruptly reversed,  with  a net outflow  of  around $12.1  billion. 
The remarkable and unexpected  swing  of capital flows of $105  billion 
(from $93  billion  inflow  to $12  billion  outflow)  represents around 11 
percent of the precrisis dollar GDP of these five countries. 
This  paper begins  by  examining  the broad characteristics  of  some 
recent financial crises: Mexico  in 1994-95,  Argentina in 1995,  and in 
East Asia  in  1997,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  the Philippines,  and 
Thailand.  Each of these episodes  displays  elements  of a self-fulfilling 
crisis,  in which capital withdrawals by creditors cascade into a financial 
panic  and result  in  an unnecessarily  deep  contraction.  As  we  stress 
throughout,  the  panic  may  be  "rational"  on  the  part of  individual 
creditors,  each  of  whom  is  trying  to  flee  ahead  of  the  others,  even 
though the collective  result is disastrous and the panic is unnecessary, 
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Table 1. External Financing  of Five Asian Countries, 1994-98a 
Billions  of dollars 
Item  1994  1995  1996  1997b  1998c 
Current account balance  -24.6  -41.3  -54.9  -26.0  17.6 
External financing (net)  47.4  80.9  92.8  15.2  15.2 
Private inflows (net)  40.5  77.4  93.0  -  12.1  -9.4 
Equity investment  12.2  15.5  19.1  -4.5  7.9 
Direct  4.7  4.9  7.0  7.2  9.8 
Portfolio  7.6  10.6  12.1  -  11.6  -  1.9 
Private creditors  28.2  61.8  74.0  -7.6  -  17.3 
Commercial banks  24.0  49.5  55.5  -21.3  -14.1 
Nonbank  4.2  12.4  18.4  13.7  -3.2 
Official inflows (net)  7.0  3.6  -0.2  27.2  24.6 
International institutions  -0.4  -0.6  -1.0  23.0  18.5 
Bilateral creditors  7.4  4.2  0.7  4.3  6.1 
Resident lending and other (net)d  -17.5  -25.9  -19.6  -11.9  -5.7 
Reserves change, excluding golde  -5.4  -13.7  -18.3  22.7  -27.1 
Source: Institute of International Finance, "Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies,"  January 29,  1998. 
a. Table entries are sums over data for Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
b. Estimate. 
c.  Forecast. 
d. Includes resident net lending, monetary gold,  and errors and omissions. 
e.  A negative value indicates an increase. 
in the sense  that the fundamentals could have supported a much more 
favorable outcome.  In short, international financial markets are intrins- 
ically  highly unstable; or to put it another way,  the East Asian crisis is 
as much a crisis of Western capitalism  as of Asian capitalism. 
The paper then considers  other factors that have contributed to the 
crisis.  East Asia was hit by several international macroeconomic  shocks 
during 1994-96,  including  a dramatic surge by competitor economies 
(China and Mexico,  in particular) and the abrupt reversal of the long- 
term trend of the yen's  appreciation relative to the dollar.  While these 
shocks  appear to have had only  a modest direct impact on Asia's  eco- 
nomic  performance,  they interacted with growing  weaknesses  in East 
Asian  financial  systems  to provoke  the crisis.  Each of  the five  crisis 
economies  had initiated,  but had not completed,  financial sector liber- 
alization and reform. The partial reforms had led to increasingly  fragile 
financial  systems,  characterized  by  growing  short-term foreign  debt, 
rapidly expanding bank credit,  and inadequate regulation and supervi- 
sion of financial institutions.  These weaknesses,  in turn, left the Asian 
economies  vulnerable to a rapid reversal of capital flows. 
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governments  and the IMF contributed to the panic  and unnecessarily 
deepened  the crisis.  Thailand and Korea,  in particular, failed  to take 
appropriate actions in late 1996 and early  1997 that could have headed 
off the crisis.  At a later stage,  the IMF's exclusive  focus  on "fixing" 
Asia,  without proper regard to the root problems of international finan- 
cial  market  instability,  imposed  excessive  costs  on  the  East  Asian 
economies. 
Finally,  we  consider  strategies  to  avoid  future  financial  crises  in 
emerging  markets.  We  examine  several  options  that would  allow 
emerging markets to slow,  but not eliminate,  short-term capital inflows 
and reduce the vulnerability  of financial institutions  to rapid reversals 
of capital. We also discuss the possibility  of a new international strategy 
for dealing  with incipient  financial crises. 
Emerging Market Crises 
In an emerging  market  financial  crisis, an economy that  has been the 
recipient of large-scale  capital inflows stops receiving  such inflows and 
instead faces  sudden demands for the repayment of outstanding loans. 
This abrupt reversal of flows leads to financial embarrassment, as loans 
fall  into  default  or  at least  are pushed  to  the  brink of  default.  The 
outcome  of  the reversal  of  capital  flows  may be  a period of  outright 
default,  a rescheduling  of  debt payments,  or rescue  by  a lender who 
provides  a new  loan  to finance  the repayments  of  past loans  that are 
falling  due. 
In the twentieth  century there have  been  several  dramatic interna- 
tional financial crises involving  developing  countries.  In fall  1929,  the 
flow  of  bond financing  from the United  States  to Latin America  sud- 
denly dried up, leading to widespread defaults by Latin American sov- 
ereign  borrowers  that took  nearly  a generation  to resolve.  In August 
1982,  Mexico  was pushed to the brink of default when it was unable to 
roll over short-term debts that were falling due. The Mexican crisis was 
soon followed  by a generalized  withdrawal of credits from developing 
countries,  which,  in turn, led to debt reschedulings,  defaults,  and re- 
negotiations  in a dozen  debtor countries.  Chile,  Uruguay,  and Argen- 
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financial deregulation in the late 1970s.3  More recently,  there have been 
several  dramatic reversals in large-scale  lending  to emerging  markets: 
Mexico,  Turkey,  and Venezuela  in 1994; Argentina in early 1995; and 
the East Asian countries in 1997. In five of these recent cases-Mexico, 
Argentina,  Indonesia,  Korea,  and Thailand-extraordinary  interna- 
tional loans were arranged to forestall defaults on debt servicing. 
These  episodes  shared certain characteristics: they were marked by 
sudden shifts in financial flows; they were to some extent unanticipated; 
and they provoked deep economic  contractions within the debtor coun- 
tries, as well as losses  to some of the foreign investors,  especially  equity 
investors.  Most  analysts have tried to explain  these  crises  in terms of 
two categories  of  "fundamental"  factors: (1)  abrupt changes  in inter- 
national  market conditions  that affect  the  ability  of  debtors to repay 
outstanding loans,  such as shifts in interest rates, commodity  prices,  or 
trade conditions;  and (2)  abrupt shifts  in the debtor country that cause 
creditors to reassess  that country's  ability or willingness  to service  the 
foreign  debt,  including  changes  in  political  leadership  or economic 
policy,  or  in  the  burden  of  the  debt  (for  example,  because  of  new 
information about the overall  size  of external debt obligations). 
In  the  1929  crisis,  the  main  factor  behind  the  cessation  of  bond 
finance is alleged  to have been  the boom  conditions  in U.S.  financial 
markets,  which  tightened  the terms for new  international bond  issu- 
ances.  In addition,  falling  international commodity  prices  called  into 
question the ability of commodity-exporting  countries in Latin America 
to service their debts.  Soon after the lending stopped,  global economic 
conditions grew markedly worse,  with the onset of the Great Depression 
and the rise of protectionism  in countries throughout the world.  In the 
1982 debt crisis in Mexico,  the most important shifts were the very steep 
rise in  interest rates in the United  States and the  accompanying steep 
appreciation of  the U.S.  dollar.  In turn, dollar appreciation and high 
interest rates caused the dollar prices of internationally traded commodi- 
ties,  including oil,  to fall. This combination of soaring interest rates and 
falling commodities prices caused international investors to reassess the 
debt-servicing capacity of borrower countries, such as Mexico. 
One striking feature of the recent crises in emerging  markets is that 
the typical  international factors have not been present.  In the crises  of 
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1994 and 1995 (in Argentina,  Mexico,  Turkey, and Venezuela),  inter- 
national financial conditions  were stable, U.S.  interest rates were mod- 
erate, and the global trading system was open. Indeed, Mexico  had just 
entered  the  North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)  with 
Canada and the United  States.  Ahd economic  reforms in Mexico  and 
Argentina had generally  led to widespread enthusiasm for these econ- 
omies.  Rudiger Dornbusch,  Ilan Goldfajn,  and Rodrigo Valdes  assign 
heavy  responsibility  for  the  Mexican  crisis  to  poor  macroeconomic 
management  within  the country.  In their view,  the Achilles's  heel  of 
the Mexican  and Argentine  economies  in  1994-95  was an overvalued 
exchange  rate,  a legacy  of  anti-inflation programs that had been  cen- 
tered on nominal  exchange  rate stability.  In an alternative interpreta- 
tion,  Sachs,  Aaron Tornell,  and Andres Velasco  argue that the over- 
valuation  of  the  exchange  rate  played  only  an indirect  role;  more 
important was creditor panic.4 
The East Asian crises  of  1997 are even  more remarkable. Not only 
were  the international  factors  seemingly  absent-with  benign  condi- 
tions  in international  financial  markets,  commodity  markets,  and the 
trading system-but  the domestic  factors that contributed to the crises 
in Mexico  and Argentina did not apply either.  None  of the East Asian 
countries  was in the aftermath of an anti-inflation program. Their real 
exchange rates were only mildly overvalued. Their overall debt carrying 
capacities  did not seem  to present imminent risks of  default.  Yet  the 
crises  hit with a vengeance. 
Self-Fulfilling  Crises 
A closer  look at the recent crises suggests  a third category of expla- 
nation: intrinsic  instability  in international  lending.5  Many  observers 
have recently  reached a similar conclusion  regarding the Mexican  epi- 
sode  and several  other emerging  markets crises  that occurred before 
1997.6  The basic notion is that international loan markets are prone to 
self-fulfilling  crises,  in  which  although  individual  creditors  may  act 
4.  Dornbusch,  Goldfajn, and Vald6s (1995); Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a, 
1996b). 
5.  It should be noted that financial  market  instability  also played a critical role in 
both the 1929 and 1982 crises. 
6.  See, for example, Calvo and Mendoza  (1996); Eichengreen,  Rose, and Wyplosz 
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rationally,  market outcomes  produce sharp, costly,  and fundamentally 
unnecessary  panicked reversals in capital flows. 
In this context,  our preferred explanation  turns on the critical  dis- 
tinction between illiquidity and insolvency.  An insolvent borrower lacks 
the net  worth to  repay outstanding  debts  out  of  future earnings.  An 
illiquid  borrower lacks the ready cash to repay current debt-servicing 
obligations,  even  though this borrower has the net worth to repay the 
debts in the long term. A liquidity crisis occurs if a solvent but illiquid 
borrower is unable to borrow fresh funds from capital markets in order 
to remain current on debt-servicing  obligations.  Because  the borrower 
is  solvent,  capital  markets could,  in principle,  provide  new  loans  to 
repay existing  debts,  with the expectation  that both old and new loans 
would be fully  serviced.  The unwillingness  or inability  of the capital 
market to provide fresh loans to the illiquid  borrower is the nub of the 
matter. 
The primary reason why markets might fail in this way is a problem 
of collective  action.  Suppose  that each individual creditor is too small 
to provide  all of  the loans  needed  by  an illiquid  debtor.  When these 
creditors  as  a group  would  be  willing  to  make  a new  loan,  but  no 
individual  creditor is  willing  to make a loan if the other creditors do 
not lend as well,  a liquidity crisis results.  One possible  market equilib- 
rium is that no individual creditor is willing to make a loan to an illiquid 
borrower precisely  because  each  creditor (rationally)  expects  that no 
other creditor is ready to make such a loan. 
Consider a simple illustration.  Suppose that a borrower owes debt D 
to a large number of existing  creditors.  The debt requires debt service 
of OD  in period one and debt service of (1  +  r)(1  -  O)D in period two. 
The debtor owns an investment project that will pay off Q2  in the second 
period,  where  Q2/(1  +  r)  is  greater than the  present  value  of  debt 
service  payments  OD +  [(1  +  r)(1  -  O)D]/(1  +  r)  =  D.  The debtor 
lacks the cash flow to repay OD, since the investment project only pays 
off  in the second  period.  Moreover,  if  the debtor defaults,  the loans 
repayments are accelerated (that is,  demanded at once by each individ- 
ual creditor).  Therefore the investment  project is scrapped, with a sal- 
vage  value  of Q1 <  D.  In that case,  the repayment of the outstanding 
loan is shared among the existing  creditors on a pro rata basis. 
Typically,  this  solvent  but illiquid  borrower would  borrow a fresh 
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+  L in the second period. Thus, with L =  OD, the total repayment due 
in the second  period is (1  +  r)OD +  (1  +  r)(1  -  O)D =  (1  +  r)D, 
which,  by assumption,  is less than Q2.  Suppose,  however,  that the most 
that each individual creditor can lend is X, where A <<  D.  This restric- 
tion might result from prudential standards imposed on individual bank 
lenders,  which  limit  their exposure  to particular debtors.  If only  one 
lender is prepared to lend in the first period, the borrower will be forced 
to default,  since  it will  not be able to service  its debts in that period. 
The  new  creditor  lending  A in  the  first period  would  then  suffer  an 
immediate  loss  on its loans (indeed,  it might receive  nothing if repay- 
ments are ordered such that all of the preceding creditors have priority 
on repayment).  A first period loan will require at least n, new lenders, 
where  n,  =  ODIX. 
There are clearly multiple rational equilibria in this situation.  In the 
normal case,  n1 lenders  routinely  step forward,  the existing  debts are 
serviced,  and future debts are also serviced.  The investment  project is 
carried to  fruition.  In the  case  of  a financial  crisis,  each  individual 
creditor decides  not to lend,  on the grounds that no other creditor is 
making  loans.  The debtor is  pushed to default.  The debt repayments 
are accelerated,  the investment project is scrapped with sharp economic 
losses,  since  the salvage  value  Q1 is  less  than Q2/(1  +  r).  And each 
individual creditor thus feels  vindicated in its decision  not to lend; after 
all,  the debtor immediately  defaults. 
In the  aftermath of  the  debt crisis  among  developing  countries  in 
1982,  Sachs and Richard Cooper sketched a simple model of this sort.7 
Douglas  Diamond  and Philip Dybvig  have offered  a much more com- 
plete  theory  along  these  lines  in the context  of  banking institutions.8 
These authors seek to explain bank runs, in which depositors en masse 
suddenly demand withdrawals of their sight deposits  and thereby push 
the bank into insolvency.  In the model,  the bank receives  deposits  in 
period  zero  from a large number of  small  depositors.  The bank then 
lends the money  for a long-term project coming  due in period two.  If 
all of the depositors  demand immediate  withdrawals of bank deposits 
in period one,  the bank must call  in the loan on the long-term  invest- 
ment.  The investment  project must then be terminated and sold for its 
7.  Sachs (1984); Cooper  and Sachs (1985). 
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salvage value in period one. The bank, moreover,  is presumably forced 
into liquidation if the salvage  value of the investment  is insufficient  to 
cover the withdrawals. 
A panic  among depositors  is therefore one  rational equilibrium.  If 
the depositors run, thereby bringing down the bank, they will lose part 
of the value of their deposits-and  thus confirm their initial motivation 
to run from the bank. The run occurs not when depositors fear that the 
bank has made a bad investment  decision,  but when individual  depos- 
itors fear that other depositors  are withdrawing  their money  from the 
bank, thereby driving the bank into illiquidity  and eventual liquidation. 
If depositors must get their money out of the bank on a first come,  first 
served  basis,  each  will  have  an incentive  to be  first in the queue  for 
early withdrawals in the event of a generalized  panic. 
Diamond and Dybvig's  paper is particularly insightful because it also 
addresses  the question  of  why,  if  banks are such fragile  institutions, 
they exist at all. The authors' answer is that a bank transforms maturities 
(that is,  borrows  short and lends  long)  in  order to  provide  liquidity 
services for its depositors,  who,  individually,  are not sure whether they 
will  need to withdraw funds in the first period or the second  period to 
meet their idiosyncratic  consumption  needs.  If there is individual  un- 
certainty over the timing of withdrawals but low aggregate uncertainty 
(that is,  the bank can generally  forecast  the overall  demand for with- 
drawals in the first period),  then the bank can provide liquidity services 
by taking on short-term deposits  and lending them long term. The only 
problem arises in the unlikely  case  that depositors  panic,  not because 
they need the money in the first period, but because the other depositors 
are also panicking. 
The illiquidity-insolvency  model  is one of two main approaches to 
explaining  herd behavior  in  financial  markets-that  is,  cases  where 
creditors act on the basis  of the actions  of other creditors,  not on the 
basis of the debtor's fundamentals, as perceived by the individual inves- 
tor. Alternatively,  Abhijit Banerjee,  Frederic Mishkin,  Joseph Stiglitz 
and Andrew Weiss,  and others have explored in detail the possible  role 
of asymmetric  information  among creditors as a cause of market inst- 
ability.9 One basic implication  of the assumption of asymmetric infor- 
mation is that each individual  creditor may rationally respond more to 
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the actions  of  other creditors-now  taken as signals-than  to private 
information.  Banerjee,  for example,  gives  an example  in which  it is 
rational, but socially  inefficient,  for each decisionmaker to discard pri- 
vate information and base actions purely on the actions of earlier movers 
in a queue.  The result is socially  inefficient  in the sense  that it would 
be Pareto improving for each investor to ignore the actions of the others 
when making an individual  decision. 
Mexico  and Argentina,  1994-95 
In the light  of the above  discussion  we  turn briefly to the Mexican 
and Argentine crises,  since they provide an invaluable backdrop for the 
Asian crises.  The Mexican crisis actually proceeded in two stages.'0 In 
early  1994 foreign  investors  became  wary,  as a result of election-year 
instability.  Capital inflows  into Mexico  dropped sharply in the second 
quarter of  1994,  raising the threat of currency depreciation and slower 
growth. Probably because this was an election year, the Bank of Mexico 
expanded  domestic  credit  in  response.  It  also  continued  to  peg  the 
exchange  rate,  after an initial  modest  depreciation.  The result was  a 
steady  decline  in reserves,  from around $28  billion  in February 1994 
to only  $10 billion  in early December  1994.  After the change of gov- 
ernment  in  early  December,  rumors of  a devaluation  started to  fly. 
Reserves  plummeted further in mid-December,  reaching around $6 bil- 
lion at their nadir. The currency was devalued over December  19 to 22, 
and then allowed  to float. 
The second  stage of the Mexican  crisis began immediately  after the 
devaluation.  International and domestic  creditors started to realize that 
the Mexican  government was due to repay around $28 billion  of short- 
term dollar-denominated  debts  (tesobonos)  within  the  following  few 
months, but had only around $6 billion  of reserves.  Suddenly,  Mexico 
was unable to borrow fresh funds to service this debt. The government 
found itself  solvent  but illiquid.  Its solvency  was reflected by the fact 
that $28  billion  represented only  around 10 percent of  Mexico's  pre- 
crisis  GDP,  and therefore was not a crushing debt burden. Moreover, 
the budget was roughly in balance. 
Thus the Mexican  government  was pushed to the edge of default in 
10. For a more complete discussion, see Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a); Ed- 
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early 1995. In the event, the United States and the IMF led an emer- 
gency international  loan to Mexico; although  no individual  private  sec- 
tor creditor could provide the amount of refinancing  needed, official 
creditors  could provide  such large sums. The Mexican  government  used 
the loan to retire tesobonos and was able to repay the loan ahead of 
schedule, in 1996. 
The patterns  of macroeconomic  adjustment  in Mexico between 1993 
and 1997 are telling.  As  shown in figure 1, Mexican GDP growth 
collapsed in 1995 but recovered strongly in 1996 and 1997. Figure 2 
plots stock prices in Mexico over 1990-97.  (Both figures also show 
data for Argentina, which is discussed below.)  Table 2 shows that 
portfolio and other private investment  flows also tumbled  in 1994 and 
1995 but quickly recovered in 1996 and 1997. Notably, foreign direct 12  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Figure 2. Quarterly  Stock Prices  in Dollars, Argentina  and Mexico,  199097a 
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investment  was much more stable than portfolio investments. The real 
exchange rate depreciated  sharply  in late 1994 and further  in 1995, but 
appreciated  in 1996 and 1997. The stock market  collapsed in the fourth 
quarter  of  1994, but recovered sharply in 1996 and 1997. In short, 
Mexico suffered a deep, sharp  shock without lasting effects. The epi- 
sode has the hallmarks  of a crisis that did not need to happen, in that it 
does not appear  to have been justified by fundamental  factors. 
The Argentine crisis followed in the wake of the Mexican crisis. 
Even though the economy was performing  strongly in 1994 and early 
1995, domestic and  foreign investors  became  skittish  about  Argentina's 
commitment  to a pegged exchange rate and began to withdraw  funds 
from its banks in the aftermath  of the Mexican collapse and in antici- 
pation  of the May 1995 elections in Argentina.  The withdrawals  turned 
into a panic: there was a mass exodus of depositors  and creditors  from 
Argentine commercial banks. The banks were pushed to the brink of 
illiquidity and default. Argentina escaped full-fledged collapse by 
means of an emergency international  bailout loan that combined  funds m  OC)cl~  - 
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from  the IMF, the World  Bank, the Inter-American  Development  Bank, 
and  some private  creditors.  As shown  in figure  1, Argentina,  like Mexico, 
suffered  an abrupt  collapse of GDP in 1995, followed by a rather  swift 
recovery  in 1996 and 1997. Also like Mexico, capital  outflows  in 1995 
turned  into net capital inflows in 1996-97.  Once again, foreign direct 
investment  was much  more  stable  than  other  kinds  of capital  flows. 
Mexico and Argentina  were vulnerable  to crisis because both were 
illiquid, in the sense that short-term  liabilities to foreigners exceeded 
short-term  assets. As a simple measure  of illiquidity, for several  emerg- 
ing markets  we compare  short-term  debts owed to international  banks 
with foreign exchange reserves held by the central bank. The results 
are presented  in table 3. The table illustrates  clearly that  for both Mex- 
ico and Argentina, this ratio had reached a vulnerable  range in 1994. 
Interestingly,  the nature  of the debts differed  markedly  in the two coun- 
tries, though  the economic outcomes were similar. In the case of Mex- 
ico, the total debts owed to international  banks  were divided among  the 
major  domestic sectors as follows: government,  41 percent;  banks, 20 
percent;  and nonbank  private sector, 39 percent. The tesobono crisis, 
in particular,  was a crisis of public sector indebtedness.  In Argentina, 
the breakdown  of debts  owed to international  banks  was quite different: 
government,  26 percent;  banks, 22 percent;  and  nonbank  private  sector, 
52 percent. In essence, in Mexico the creditor  run was on the govern- 
ment;  in Argentina,  it was on the banking  system. We show below that 
there has been similar variety in the recent Asian crises. In Indonesia, 
the international  bank debts are mainly owed by the nonfinancial  cor- 
porate sector; in Korea and Thailand, they are owed mainly by the 
financial  sector. 
Why Domestic  Capital Markets Are Less Prone  to Panic 
Advanced economies have introduced  mechanisms  and institutions 
that limit the onset of self-fulfilling panics within the domestic econ- 
omy. These lessons offer insights for understanding  the nature  of inter- 
national  crises. 
The United States, for example, was long prone to banking crises 
that were heavily domestic in origin. Such crises occurred in 1873, 
1893, and 1907. The last of these helped to bring about in 1913 the 
Federal Reserve Act, which established the Federal Reserve System, ~~,  0000-~~0r10-  m  66  m  60-00- 
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with the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort to member banking 
institutions  in the event of creditor  runs. The lender  of last resort  mech- 
anism short-circuits  a Diamond-Dybvig  panic by providing  the neces- 
sary  funds, L =  OD,  to preserve  short-term  liquidity. The central  bank, 
the ultimate issuer of high-powered  money, is ostensibly free to issue 
credits as needed to illiquid but solvent financial  institutions, in order 
to overcome such panics. The lender of last resort  mechanism  has two 
aspects. Most directly, it prevents  outright  default  by providing  liquid- 
ity on an elastic basis. More subtly, but perhaps  more important,  it can 
eliminate a self-fulfilling panic if depositors  and creditors  believe that 
the lender  of last resort  will provide  the credits,  L, as needed  to forestall 
a banking  collapse. Armed  with that knowledge, there is no reason  for 
an individual  depositor  to panic, even if others do so. 
This mechanism  has been used several times in recent  years to ward 
off panic in the United States. When the stock market  crashed  in Oc- 
tober 1987, the Federal  Reserve Board  responded  by lowering interest 
rates and flooding the financial  markets  with increased  liquidity to en- 
sure the continued  operation  of the settlements.  During  the savings and 
loans crisis of the mid-1980s, when the government  began to close 
down insolvent institutions, the Fed-with  strong support from the 
White House-established  a $100 billion line of credit that would be 
made available to support  the remaining  institutions, thus limiting the 
potential  for a bank run. And in 1991, when several major  banks  were 
probably insolvent, in that their liabilities exceeded their assets (if 
assets were marked  to market),  the Bush administration  and  the Federal 
Reserve Board took steps to keep them liquid until they had a chance 
to recapitalize. 
The lender of last resort mechanism  depends on the ability of this 
lender  to issue sufficient  credit  to cover the liquidity  needs of the cash- 
strapped  borrowers-usually  banks, but sometimes other financial  in- 
stitutions. II When the loans are in domestic currency, the lender of last 
resort in principle is assured of the means to provide the necessary 
credits. When the loans are in foreign currency, however, the central 
bank may be unable to fulfill its role as lender of last resort due to a 
lack of adequate  foreign exchange reserves. Thus in Mexico there was 
11. For  example, the Fed provided  credit  to several  brokerage  firms  in the aftermath 
of the October  1987 stock market  crash, in order  to prevent  a meltdown  of the settlements 
system. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  17 
no threat of outright default on peso-denominated  Treasury bills,  only 
on tesobonos.  The lender of last resort function  can also be frustrated 
by the assignment of monetary policy  to goals other than the provision 
of liquidity.  If the central bank is pegging  the exchange  rate or main- 
taining a gold standard, for example,  it may be unwilling  or unable by 
law to act as a lender of  last resort,  even  though in principle it could 
issue  the  needed  credits.  Milton  Friedman  and Anna  Schwartz  and 
Barrie Wigmore  argue convincingly  that during the Great Depression, 
the Fed refused its role as lender of last resort in part for fear of pushing 
the United  States off  the Gold  Standard, an eventuality  which  in fact 
transpired in  1934.12  And Argentina's  vulnerability  to financial panic 
in  1995 in part came from the widely  recognized  fact that the govern- 
ment was limited in its capacity to act as a lender of last resort because 
of the currency board arrangements, under which the Argentine peso is 
fixed  at one  to one  with  the U. S.  dollar  and the currency board has 
limited ability to issue  credits that are not backed by dollar reserves. 
In addition to  the  lender of  last resort facility,  domestic  financial 
markets tend to have other bulwarks against self-fulfilling  panics  that 
are not available in the international context.  Deposit insurance, backed 
ultimately  by the central bank,  is  a crucial  instrument for preventing 
bank runs by domestic  depositors.  Notably,  the panic of  1933,  which 
prompted the adoption of  the Federal Deposit  Insurance Act  of  1934 
and the creation of the Federal Deposit  Insurance Corporation, was the 
last major banking panic in the United States. The effective  functioning 
of deposit insurance,  like the lender of last resort mechanism,  depends 
on deposits being in domestic currency; countries with dollarized bank- 
ing  systems  are often  exposed  to  creditor runs even  if  some  deposit 
insurance arrangements are in place,  because  such insurance tends to 
lacks adequate reserve funds,  and therefore credibility. 
Another bulwark against panic is a well-defined  and relatively  trans- 
parent system for managing bankruptcies, liquidations,  and other forms 
of debt workouts.  These types of institutional and legal mechanism  do 
not exist in some countries,  and they are often unworkable when cred- 
itors and debtors are residents of different countries.  As noted above, 
part of the reason for a financial panic is the creditor grab-race, in which 
creditors flee from an illiquid or insolvent  debtor, each trying to be the 
12. Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963); Wigmore  (1987). 18  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
first one out of the door.  This has very high costs:  solvent  and funda- 
mentally  healthy firms may be driven to default and eventual  liquida- 
tion,  debtors are unable to attract working capital,  and so forth. Bank- 
ruptcy laws can forestall  such adverse outcomes  by bringing creditors 
and debtors  together  for  orderly  negotiations,  rather than disorderly 
panics.  They  may  also  ensure  adequate interim  financing  of  illiquid 
enterprises in the process. 
Many emerging  markets lack the regulatory and legal infrastructure 
to  support highly  liberalized  banking  transactions,  and  they  almost 
invariably lack the lender of last resort capacity to handle sudden shifts 
in  depositor  confidence.  Trenchant  observers,  therefore,  have  long 
warned about the dangers of premature financial liberalization  in such 
markets.  Notably,  Ronald McKinnon  and Huw Pill  stress the need to 
"restrain  short-term  capital  flows,  particularly  those  intermediated 
through the domestic  banking system."  13 We reach very  similar con- 
clusions  below. 
East Asia's Growth Strategy: Was the Miracle a Mirage? 
One reason why  the East Asian  crisis  came  as such a surprise was 
the region's  long track record of economic  success.  The broad outlines 
of that success  are well-known.  Figure 3 shows that in each of Malaysia, 
Indonesia,  and Thailand,  per capita income  more than quadrupled be- 
tween  1965 and 1996,  and in Korea income  rose seven-fold.  Average 
incomes  in these  four countries  have  climbed  from  10 percent of  the 
U.S.  average  in  1965 to around 27 percent in the late  1990s.  Table 4 
shows  that in Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  and Thailand average  life 
expectancy  at birth rose from fifty-seven  years in  1970  to sixty-eight 
years in 1995,  and the adult literacy rate jumped from 73 percent to 91 
percent.  Notably,  the benefits of economic  growth were widely  shared 
throughout the population. Incomes of the poorest fifth of the population 
grew just as fast as average incomes,  and poverty rates fell substantially 
in each country. In Indonesia,  for example,  the share of the population 
living below  the poverty line fell from 60 percent in the 1960s to under 
15 percent in  1996. 
13. McKinnon  and Pill (1996, p. 35). Another  notable  example is Diaz-Alejandro 
(1988). Steven  Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  19 
Figure 3. GDP per Capita, Selected Asian Countries,  1965-96 
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The origins of Asia's  rapid growth have been hotly debated,  and the 
discussion  has taken on new energy with the onset of the financial crisis. 
Some  observers  now  suggest  that Asia's  recent development  is some- 
how a mirage-that  it never really happened-or  has been completely 
wiped  out by  the  crisis.  These  views  are obviously  mistaken.  There 
have  been  enormous  gains  in  income  levels,  health,  education,  and 
general welfare in Asia during the last three decades,  and these will not 
be dissipated  by an extended  recession.  Even if the crisis  is followed 
by several  years of  zero growth,  standards of  living  will  still  be four 
times higher than they were one generation ago,  and 50 percent higher 
than they were just one decade ago. 
Others argue, more reasonably,  that there may have been something 
in Asia's  growth strategy that made the financial crash inevitable.  As 20  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Table  4. Human Development  Indicators, Selected Developing  Countries, 
1970 and 1995 
Units  as indicated 
Other  developing 
Indicator  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  countriesa 
Life expectancyb 
1970  48  60  62  57  58  56 
1995  64  72  72  66  69  63 
Literacy  ratec 
1970  54  88  60  83  79  43 
1995  84  98  85  95  94  64 
Income  of poorest  fifthd 
1970c  392  303  431  218  361  731 
1990,  908  2071  1070  435  726  892 
Source: Authors' calculations. Data on life expectancy and literacy are from World Bank, World  Developmenit  Indicators, 
available on CD-ROM. Data on income shares are from Deininger and Squire (1996); PPP income levels are from the Penn 
World Tables,  mark 5.6,  available on the worldwide web page of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
a. Average across countries. Set of countries and observation year vary, based on data availability.  Averages for life 
expectancy includes  141 countries in 1970 and 131 in 1995; for literacy, 86 in 1970 and 108 in 1990; and for income. 20 
countries in both 1970 and 1990. 
b. Life expectancy at birth. 
c.  Percent of population fifteen years and older. 
d. Mean of poorest fifth,  1985 dollars, converted at PPP exchange rates. 
e.  1976 for Indonesia,  1965 for Korea and the Philippines, and 1969 for Thailand. 
f.  1988 for Korea and the Philippines,  1989 for Malaysia, and 1992 for Thailand. 
we document elsewhere  and summarize below,  problems that began to 
emerge  in  the  1990s  in  both  macroeconomic  developments  (capital 
inflows,  real exchange  rate appreciation)  and microeconomic  funda- 
mentals  (credit  expansion,  financial  regulation  and supervision)  did 
contribute to the onset of the crisis. 14 The argument that the crash was 
destined  might  be  compelling  if  it  were  in  fact  true that the  Asian 
"miracle"  was the result of strong authoritarian government,  a close- 
knit relationship between  governments  and corporate leaders in foster- 
ing heavy industry, or large state subsidies that helped exporters to gain 
market share. Although this view of the "Asian  model of development" 
has gained  widespread  popularity during the past decade,  it generally 
fails to hold up under close  scrutiny.  Such interpretations draw heavily 
on  the  distinctive  experiences  of  Japan,  Korea,  and Taiwan,  where 
governments  did intervene  heavily  for a period,  with  directed credit, 
subsidies,  and tariff protection to promote specific strategic industries.  '5 
14. Radelet  and Sachs (1998). 
15. Amsden (1989); Wade (1990). Steven Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs  21 
But these  kinds  of  interventionist  policies  clearly  were  not central to 
the successes  of  Hong  Kong,  Singapore,  Thailand,  China,  Malaysia, 
or Indonesia.  Hong Kong is probably the most open and least interven- 
tionist economy  in the world; Singapore's  interventions  were very dif- 
ferent  from  those  in  Northeast  Asia;  and industrial  interventions  in 
Southeast  Asia  and  China  have  clearly  hindered  rather than helped 
growth.16 Even  in  Korea,  where  such  industrial  policies  were  most 
extensive,  there is plenty  of  evidence  that deeper strength came from 
the general orientation toward export-led  growth. 
We  argue elsewhere  that the core strategy in East Asia's  industrial 
success  was  to  integrate  national  with  international  production,  not 
merely through export orientation, but also through specific institutions 
such as technology  licensing,  original  equipment manufacturing,  and 
export processing zones,  which helped to attract export-oriented foreign 
investment.  17 This  strategy  enabled  economies  to  begin  with  low- 
technology  manufactured export activities  (for example,  apparel, foot- 
wear, electronics  assembly)  and gradually upgrade to high-technology 
products,  such  as  consumer  electronics  design  and production.  This 
outward-oriented  industrialization  strategy  also  depended  fundamen- 
tally on four core macroeconomic  policies  that were pursued throughout 
the region:  high  rates of  government  and private  saving;  reliance  on 
private ownership  in the industrial sector;  low  inflation rates and re- 
strained domestic credit policies; and convertible currencies, with low or 
zero black market premiums on foreign exchange.  During the period of 
rapid foreign borrowing in the 1990s, the vast proportion of new lending 
supported increased investment spending rather than consumption. 
One part of  the process  of  long-term  development  is to strengthen 
financial institutions.  As  production processes  become  more complex 
and more deeply integrated with the world economy,  a greater range of 
sophisticated  and well-regulated  financial services  becomes  important. 
Changes in firm ownership structure and financing arrangements require 
deeper capital markets for equities,  bonds, bank loans,  and other forms 
of  financial  intermediation.  More  capital-intensive  production  pro- 
cesses  require low-cost  long-run financing in order to be competitive, 
and a range of hedging instruments to protect against a variety of market 
risks. 
16. Perkins  (1994); Hill (1996); Asian Development  Bank (1997). 
17. Radelet, Sachs, and Lee (1997); Radelet  and Sachs (1997). 22  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
At least in part, the East Asian financial crisis has its roots in attempts 
at financial  reform  in  the  early  1990s  that were  aimed  at upgrading 
financial institutions  but in fact  left  individual  economies  exposed  to 
the instabilities  of international financial markets. For example,  in In- 
donesia  a series  of  financial deregulation  packages  led to tremendous 
expansion in the banking sector: the number of private banks (including 
foreign  and joint  venture  banks)  nearly  tripled  from  seventy-four  in 
1988  to 206  six  years  later.'8 The centerpiece  of Thailand's  effort  to 
compete  with Singapore  and Hong Kong as a regional financial center 
was the now notorious Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), 
introduced  in  1992.  The  BIBF  allowed  for very  rapid growth  in the 
number of  financial institutions  that could borrow and lend in foreign 
currencies,  both on- and offshore.  In Korea,  financial market reforms 
in the mid- l990s  similarly opened the door to greatly expanded banking 
activity and increased the access  of domestic  banks to short-term inter- 
national loans.19 
In general,  the rapid expansion in financial services was not matched 
by careful regulation and supervision.  Regulatory reforms tended to be 
partial and incomplete.  As a result of this piecemeal  approach, reforms 
in one area often opened up loopholes  in other areas, which firms were 
quick  to exploit.20 Moreover,  the huge  expansion  in banking activity 
would have made supervision  much more difficult,  even under the best 
of  circumstances-and  they  were  not the best.  State-owned  banks in 
Indonesia  and Korea were regularly allowed  to break many prudential 
regulations  without  penalty.  As  in  numerous  countries  around  the 
world,  many banks were owned  by politically  well-connected  individ- 
uals who used them to finance the operations  of  affiliated companies. 
In Indonesia,  for example,  almost every major corporations had its own 
bank, and the line between  the two entities  was often blurred. 
Ironically,  East Asia became vulnerable to external financial shocks 
in part because it attempted to reform its financial markets in a market- 
oriented manner. Those countries hit hardest by the crisis-like  Mexico 
and Argentina in the early 1990s and Chile in the early 1980s-had  all 
started, but had not completed,  the process of financial market liberal- 
ization  and reform. The reforms led to dramatic growth in the number 
18. Cole and Slade (1996). 
19. See Park  (1998). 
20.  Cole and Slade (1996). Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  23 
of  banks  and their linkages  to  the  international  economy,  which,  in 
turn, increased the exposure of these economies  to international finan- 
cial shocks,  mainly through the remarkable buildup of short-term debts. 
Countries with stronger financial systems  (for example,  Singapore and 
Hong Kong) had taken steps to redress inadequate regulations and poor 
supervision,  and thus were  less  prone to a crisis.  At the other end of 
the  spectrum,  countries  that had not  undertaken significant  financial 
sector reforms (for example,  China and Vietnam) were shielded by the 
fact that they had received  much less  short-term capital inflow  in the 
early  1990s.  Seen in this light,  the crisis  was not the inevitable  result 
of an Asian capitalist model,  but rather, an accident of partial financial 
reforms that exposed  these  economies  more directly  to the instability 
of international financial markets. 
The Onset of the Crisis 
In related work,  we  describe  the onset  of  the East Asian  crisis  in 
detail.21 We point out that while  the East Asian  economies  continued 
to  achieve  rapid economic  growth  in the  1990s,  there were  growing 
imbalances  and weaknesses  at both the microeconomic  and macroeco- 
nomic levels.  Most important, there was a rapid buildup of short-term 
external debt into weak financial systems-made  possible  both because 
East Asia's  successful  track record attracted foreign  credits,  and be- 
cause  partial financial market liberalization  in the region  opened  new 
channels for the entry of foreign capital. The inflows led to appreciating 
real exchange  rates, to a rapid expansion  of bank lending,  and in par- 
ticular, to increasing vulnerability  to a reversal in capital flows.  When 
capital inflows did wane in late 1996 and early 1997, a series of missteps 
by Asian  governments,  market participants,  the IMF,  and the interna- 
tional  community  resulted  in a financial  panic.  The  crisis  was  much 
deeper than was either necessary  or inevitable. 
Several  aspects  of  the buildup to the crisis  are worth highlighting. 
First, annual capital inflows into the five crisis economies-Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia,  the Philippines,  and Thailand-averaged  over 6 per- 
cent  of  GDP  between  1990  and  1996.  Capital  inflows  into  Thailand 
21.  Radelet  and Sachs (1998). 24  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
averaged  over  10  percent  of  GDP  during  the  1990s  and  reached  a 
remarkable  13 percent  of  GDP  in  1995  alone.  In Malaysia,  inflows 
averaged 9 percent of  GDP between  1990  and 1996,  jumping  to over 
15 percent of GDP for both 1992 and 1993 and then tapering off.  While 
Thailand's  inflows  predominately represented borrowing by banks and 
financial institutions,  the bulk of Malaysia's  inflows  were in the form 
of foreign  direct investment,  which  is less  prone to quick reversal.  In 
Indonesia,  inflows  averaged a more modest 4 percent of GDP,  mostly 
in the form of borrowing by private corporations. 
Second.  the East Asian governments maintained exchange rates with 
either very  little  variation  (for example,  Malaysia,  Thailand,  and the 
Philippines)  or small,  predictable changes  (for example,  Indonesia and 
Korea). In effect,  the central banks absorbed the risks of exchange  rate 
movements  on behalf of  investors,  which  helped to encourage  capital 
inflows,  especially  with short maturity structures. 
Third, exchange rates appreciated in real terms, as the capital inflows 
put upward pressure on the prices  of nontradables.  Real effective  ex- 
change rates appreciated by more than 25 percent in Indonesia,  Malay- 
sia,  the  Philippines,  and Thailand  between  1990  and early  1997;  in 
Korea, the appreciation was about 12 percent. Note,  however,  that the 
real  appreciations  in  Asia  during  the  1990s  were  relatively  modest 
compared  with  those  seen  in  other developing  countries.  Brazil  and 
Argentina,  for example,  have had real exchange  rate appreciations of 
more than 40 percent since  1990. 
Fourth,  export growth,  measured in current U.S.  dollars,  began to 
slow in the mid-1990s  and then dropped sharply in 1996 in every coun- 
try. In Thailand,  exports actually fell  in nominal dollar terms in 1996, 
while  in Korea exports increased  by only  3.7  percent.  Several  factors 
probably contributed to this pattern: the increasing overvaluation of the 
exchange  rates, the appreciation of the Japanese yen against the dollar 
after 1994,  the devaluation  of  the Chinese  yuan in January 1994,  the 
competitive  effects  of  Mexico's  participation in NAFTA  and the de- 
valuation of the Mexican peso,  and the worldwide glut in semiconductor 
production. 
Fifth,  domestic  bank lending  expanded  rapidly throughout the re- 
22  gion.2  In Thailand, Korea, and Malaysia,  banking claims on the private 
22.  See McKinnon and Pill (1996) for a formal analysis of the "overborrowing 
syndrome"  in emerging  markets. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  25 
sector increased by more than 50 percent relative to GDP in seven years, 
reaching  140 percent of GDP in 1996.  The Philippines,  starting from a 
much lower base, recorded private credit growth of over 40 percent per 
year  between  1993  and  1996.  Only  in  Indonesia  did  credit  growth 
remain at more modest  levels-but  in this case,  private corporations 
were  borrowing  directly  offshore.  Much  of  the  new  lending  was  fi- 
nanced by the banks borrowing offshore.  In Korea,  the foreign  liabili- 
ties of the banking system more than doubled from 4.5  percent of GDP 
in 1993 to 9.5  percent of GDP in mid-1997.  In the Philippines,  equiv- 
alent liabilities  soared from 8.8  percent of GDP at the end of  1995 to 
an astonishing  21  percent of  GDP just eighteen  months later, in mid- 
1997.  The most extreme case was Thailand,  where,  after the introduc- 
tion of the BIBF,  the foreign  liabilities  of banks and financial institu- 
tions increased rapidly to over 28 percent of GDP by  1995. 
Sixth,  a modestly  increasing  share of  domestic  bank lending  was 
apparently used  for real estate,  property,  and the purchase of  equity 
funds. Official data on lending by sector show a small increase in loans 
for real estate,  but nearly all market observers suggest that they under- 
state the magnitude of these activities. 
Finally,  a rising share of foreign borrowing was in the form of short- 
term debt.  In particular, table 5 shows  that by the end of  1996  short- 
term debts  to offshore  banks in Korea,  Thailand,  and Indonesia  had 
reached $68 billion,  $46 billion,  and $34 billion,  respectively.  Indeed, 
these numbers understate total short-term liabilities,  since nonbank fi- 
nance (for example,  bonds) is not included. The ratio of short-term debt 
to foreign exchange  reserves in each of these three countries exceeded 
one  after  1994.  A  ratio greater than one  is  not by itself  sufficient  to 
spark a crisis,  as long as foreign creditors are willing  to roll over their 
loans.  However,  it does  indicate  vulnerability  to a crisis:  once  some- 
thing sparks a withdrawal of foreign capital,  each foreign creditor has 
an incentive  to demand repayment quickly,  since each one knows that 
there is not enough foreign exchange  to repay them all. 
It should be emphasized  that these imbalances  were centered in the 
private  sector  rather than  in  the  government.  Throughout  the  early 
1990s,  East  Asian  governments  kept their budgets  in  surplus,  main- 
tained prudent levels  of overall money growth,  and kept inflation rates 
below  10 percent.  In each country,  government  foreign  debt actually 
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Table 5.  Debt to Foreign Banks  and Foreign Exchange  Reserves,  Selected  Crisis 
Countries,  1995-97 
Billions  of dollars 
Debt by sector 
Year  Nonbank  Short-term  Ratio: short-term 
and country  Total  Banks  Public  private  debt  Reserves  debt-to-reserves 
End 1995 
Indonesia  44.5  8.9  6.7  28.8  27.6  14.7  1.9 
Malaysia  16.8  4.4  2.1  10.1  7.9  23.9  0.3 
Philippies  8.3  2.2  2.7  3.4  4.1  7.8  0.5 
Thailand  62.8  25.8  2.3  34.7  43.6  37.0  1.2 
Korea  77.5  50.0  6.2  21.4  54.3  32.7  1.7 
Total  209.9  91.3  20.0  98.4  137.5  . ..  ... 
End 1996 
Indonesia  55.5  11.7  6.9  36.8  34.2  19.3  1.8 
Malaysia  22.2  6.5  2.0  13.7  11.2  27.1  0.4 
Philippines  13.3  5.2  2.7  5.3  7.7  11.7  0.7 
Thailand  70.2  25.9  2.3  41.9  45.7  38.7  1.2 
Korea  100.0  65.9  5.7  28.3  67.5  34.1  2.0 
Total  261.2  115.2  19.6  126.0  166.3  . ..  ... 
Mid- 1997 
Indonesia  58.7  12.4  6.5  39.7  34.7  20.3  1.7 
Malaysia  28.8  10.5  1.9  16.5  16.3  26.6  0.6 
Philippines  14.1  5.5  1.9  6.8  8.3  9.8  0.8 
Thailand  69.4  26.1  2.0  41.3  45.6  31.4  1.5 
Korea  103.4  67.3  4.4  31.7  70.2  34.1  2.1 
Total  274.4  121.8  16.7  136.0  175.1  . ..  ... 
Addendum 
Mexico 
End 1994  64.6  16.7  24.9  22.8  33.2  6.4  5.2 
End 1995  57.3  11.5  23.5  22.3  26.0  17.1  1.5 
Source: Authors' calculations.  Data on debt are from Bank for International Settlements (1998);  and on reserves, from 
IMF, Internatiotnal  Finatncial Statistics,  various issues. 
Withdrawal of Capital and the Financial  Panic 
In early  1997 pressure began to mount in both Korea and Thailand. 
In Korea,  Hanbo  steel  declared  bankruptcy in January, leaving  $5.8 
billion  in  debts.  In the next  few  months,  both  Sammi  Steel  and Kia 
Motors faced  similar difficulties.  These problems put increasing  pres- 
sures on merchant banks, which had borrowed offshore to lend to these 
chaebol  (conglomerates),  and began to raise concerns  about the finan- Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  27 
cial  strength of other chaebol.  In Thailand,  property prices fell  in late 
1996,  and a major property developer,  Somprasong Land, was unable 
to meet a foreign debt payment due on February 5,  1997.  These devel- 
opments  provided  the  first clear  indication  that financing  companies 
heavily  exposed  to the Bangkok property market were in trouble.  The 
baht came under attack in late 1996,  and twice again in the early months 
of  1997.  In March the Thai government  promised  to buy $3.9  billion 
in bad property debt from finance companies,  but quickly reneged.  As 
evidence  grew of the fragile condition of the property sector and finan- 
cial  institutions,  speculation  mounted  that foreign  exchange  reserves 
were dwindling  and that the government  would have to float the baht. 
The government protested that it would neither allow Finance One, the 
largest  financial  institution,  to go  under nor float the baht,  but to no 
avail.  By  late  June,  Thailand  had sharply  reduced  its  liquid  foreign 
exchange  reserves,  and the baht was cut loose  on July 2. 
Foreign  creditors  reacted  by  withdrawing  capital  from  countries 
around the region,  and exchange  rates came under intense pressure. By 
early  September,  the  currencies  of  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philip- 
pines,  and Thailand  had each  fallen  by  20  percent  or more.  As  the 
currencies fell and capital flows reversed,  several forces came into play 
to create a self-reinforcing  spiral into panic. First, creditors made little 
effort to distinguish  among these Southeast Asian countries in the early 
stages; they assumed that if Thailand was in trouble,  the others could 
not be too far behind.  Second,  as exchange  rates depreciated  and the 
domestic  currency costs  of servicing  foreign debts rose,  foreign  credi- 
tors became  more reluctant to extend new loans and roll over existing 
loans.  Domestic  debtors  had to buy  foreign  exchange  to  retire these 
debts, putting more pressure on exchange  rates, which,  in turn, further 
encouraged  creditors  not to roll  over loans.  Third,  domestic  debtors, 
many of whom had not hedged their foreign exchange exposures,  began 
to purchase foreign exchange  to try to close  their positions.  Fourth, the 
major ratings agencies  belatedly  downgraded countries  in the region, 
triggering further withdrawals by creditors. Fifth, as we discuss in more 
detail below,  the initial responses  of governments in the region as well 
as the international community  added fuel to the fire. As international 
confidence  in their initial strategies waned and it became clear that the 
economic  contractions  in the region  would be much larger than origi- 
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Initial Responses 
It is  likely  that had the Thai government  reacted differently  to the 
fall  in land and stock prices  and the growing  fragility  of the financial 
institutions  in late  1996  and early  1997,  that country would  have  es- 
caped  a serious  crisis.  Contagion  to the rest of the region  would  also 
have been avoided.  Despite  the fall in property prices,  the warnings of 
investment analysts,  and the large infusions  of money to ailing banking 
institutions,  the  government  staunchly  maintained  the exchange  rate 
peg of the baht to the U.S.  dollar, thereby leading to a massive  loss  of 
reserves.  By  the time  the central bank floated  the baht,  it had spent 
considerable  foreign exchange  reserves in defense  of the currency and 
had committed large amounts of foreign exchange to forward purchases 
of baht.23 Moreover,  it had spent billions  of dollars in baht to prop up 
failed  banking  institutions,  without  taking  fundamental  steps  toward 
their closure,  merger,  or rehabilitation.24 As  a result,  the country be- 
came extremely  vulnerable to investor panic,  because  investors recog- 
nized that Thailand's available foreign exchange reserves had fallen far 
below  the outstanding short-term debts owed to international banks. 
Once the crisis began to spread, other countries also made mistakes 
that  accelerated  the  capital  withdrawals.  Malaysian  prime  minister 
Mohamed Mahathir's harsh comments  about foreign  investors  and his 
threats of banning foreign  currency trading are prime examples.  Thai- 
land and Malaysia  imposed  mild capital controls.  Malaysia  announced 
it would  establish  a fund to  support stock  prices,  but abandoned the 
plan a few  days  later.  Korea seemed  to be boldly  facing  some  of  its 
problems by allowing  some chaebol  to go bankrupt, but it inexplicably 
spent  down  its  reserves  in a desperate  attempt to  defend  the  Korean 
won in October and November. 
23.  The Thai government  reportedly  spent $16 billion in defense of the baht in late 
1996 and early 1997, and by June had an additional $23 billion in forward swaps 
outstanding.  It did not stand to lose all of the $23 billion, but rather,  the difference 
between  the forward  rates  and  the future  spot  rates  at the time when  the forward  positions 
would be liquidated.  Moreover, some of the forward  contracts  were dated as much as 
one year ahead, so that the losses would not be realized  immediately. 
24.  The government  reportedly  injected between $3 billion and $4 billion into the 
Bangkok Bank of Commerce  after seizing it in 1996. The Bank of Thailand  also an- 
nounced  that it spent 500 billion baht (about  $19.3 billion) to keep ninety-one  finance 
companies afloat in 1996 and early 1997, of which it expected to recover 100 billion 
baht  at most. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs  29 
Ironically,  Indonesia initially  was widely  praised for its handling of 
the crisis,  as it first widened  the trading band on the rupiah and then 
floated  the  currency  in  August.25 It resisted  the  temptation  to  spend 
reserves,  eased  rules governing  foreign  ownership  of  stocks,  and an- 
nounced that it would postpone  over one hundred investment  projects. 
It retracted that decision  for several large projects,  however,  and then 
later postponed  them again.  These  on-again  and off-again  pronounce- 
ments, and the requirement that state enterprises pull their large deposits 
out of the banking system,  which sharply increased interest rates, frayed 
nerves and encouraged further withdrawals of foreign  funding. 
The IMF programs,  rather than inspiring confidence,  seem  to have 
accelerated  the flight of  currency from the region,  despite  pledges  of 
more than $100 billion  in emergency  funds to Thailand, Indonesia,  and 
Korea.  The  initial  programs focused  on  fiscal  deficits,  high  interest 
rates, restrictive money growth, and the immediate closures of insolvent 
financial institutions.  But these  programs in Thailand,  Indonesia,  and 
Korea were discarded within months-three  weeks,  in the case of Ko- 
rea.  In each country,  although the signing  of the IMF agreement was 
greeted by brief enthusiasm,  it was  followed  by the continued  depre- 
ciation  of the exchange  rate and declining  stock prices.  The first sign 
of an end to the currency free-falls  came only on December  24,  1997, 
when the international community  initiated a different approach to the 
problem based on debt restructuring, accelerated disbursements  of in- 
ternational funding,  and more comprehensive  and rational restructuring 
of the financial sector. 
Alternative Approaches to Explaining the Crisis 
We  discussed  above  three broad categories  of explanations  for the 
East  Asian  crisis:  shifts  in  international  market conditions;  growing 
weaknesses  and mismanagement  in the Asian economies;  and instabil- 
ities  intrinsic  to  the international  capital  markets.  In this  section  we 
apply this tripartite framework,  with  an eye  toward proper policy  re- 
sponses and guidelines  for preventing or containing future crises.  There 
25.  See, for example, Douglas Appell, "In Battle  for Investors,  This Is No Contest: 
Amid a Crisis, Indonesia  Opens Up and Thrives as Malaysia Stumbles," Asian Wall 
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are certainly  candidate explanations  in each category;  the question  is 
one of degree.  While  we believe  that shifts in international conditions 
and mismanagement  (and corruption) played  some  role,  there is  also 
clear evidence  that intrinsic capital market instability  is a key factor in 
the depth, severity,  extent,  and simultaneity  of the region's  problems. 
Shifts in International  Market Conditions 
On the most general level,  international market conditions  were be- 
nign or favorable before the onset of the East Asian crisis.  U. S. interest 
rates remained low.  World commodity  markets were relatively  stable. 
Risk premiums on loans to emerging markets were falling.  The growth 
in total volume  of international trade was  strong,  if a little bit slower 
in  the  aggregate  in  1996  and  1997  compared  with  1993-95.  World 
export volumes  grew by 6 percent in  1996,  down  slightly  from the 9 
percent recorded in 1994 and 1995 but still above the world average for 
the early  1990s.26 
Despite  this  favorable  environment,  several  hypotheses  about the 
crisis center around unexpected  international shocks to the Asian econ- 
omy.  On closer inspection,  however,  it appears that these shocks made 
at best  a modest  contribution.  Specifically,  such  arguments focus  on 
the collapse  of export growth in  1996  in Thailand and Korea,  as well 
as slowing  export  growth in Malaysia  and Indonesia.  Table  6  shows 
change in exports and imports in 1995 and 1996 for selected  countries. 
The most extreme case was Thailand, where the dollar value of exports 
actually  fell  1 percent in  1996,  after two years of growth in excess  of 
20 percent. Korea's exports grew by just 4 percent in 1996,  down from 
30  percent  in  1995;  and Malaysia's  grew by  only  6 percent in  1996, 
down  from 26  percent the previous  year.  Indonesia's  situation  was  a 
little  different:  in  1996  it registered  10 percent export growth,  about 
the same as in the previous  three years-but  well  below  the  1990-92 
average.  Only  the Philippines  registered  substantial export growth  in 
1996,  at 17 percent. 
From table  6  it  can be  seen  that the  division  of  the fall  in  dollar 
export earnings  between  volume  and unit value  differs  widely  across 
countries  (although  the usual strong caveats  about the poor quality of 
26.  In value terms, world exports  grew just 4 percent  in 1996, after  jumping  by an 
average  of 17 percent  in 1994 and 1995; International  Monetary  Fund  (1997c). Steven  Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  31 
Table 6.  Export  and Import  Growth  Rates,  Selected  Countries,  1995-96a 
Percent 
Value growth  Volume growth  Unit value change 
Country  1995  1996  1995  1996  1995  1996 
Exports 
China  22.9  1.6  15.3  8.3  6.6  -  6.2 
India  22.7  7.4  22.4  16.9  0.2  -8.1 
Hong Kong  14.8  4.0  1.9  -8.6  12.6  13.8 
Korea  30.3  3.7  24.0  19.1  5.0  -12.9 
Singapore  22.1  5.7  15.7  6.3  5.6  -0.6 
Indonesia  13.4  9.7  10.3  4.8  2.8  4.7 
Malaysia  26.0  5.8  15.6  13.6  9.0  -6.9 
Philippines  31.6  16.7  17.0  18.8  12.4  -  1.8 
Thailand  25.1  -  1.3  14.2  -0.7  9.5  -0.6 
Argentina  33.9  13.6  17.8  3.2  13.7  10.0 
Mexico  40.3  22.6  24.5  14.7  12.7  6.9 
Poland  34.3  6.8  30.8  6.9  2.7  -  0.1 
Imports 
China  11.6  7.6  15.1  16.4  -  3.0  -  7.5 
India  28.6  8.3  23.6  18.9  4.0  -8.9 
Hong Kong  19.2  3.0  13.6  4.0  4.9  -  1.0 
Korea  32.0  11.3  21.2  11.9  8.9  -0.6 
Singapore  21.3  5.5  13.0  6.4  7.3  -0.9 
Indonesia  27.0  5.7  17.4  10.7  8.2  -4.6 
Malaysia  30.5  0.9  23.4  17.7  5.8  -  14.3 
Philippines  25.7  20.4  14.6  24.2  9.7  -3.0 
Thailand  30.0  3.8  15.9  -  3.6  12.1  7.7 
Argentina  -6.5  18.1  -17.5  25.2  13.3  -5.7 
Mexico  -23.1  30.4  -14.9  20.8  -9.6  8.0 
Poland  35.9  27.8  24.5  28.9  9.1  -0.8 
Source: Authors' calculations.  Data on values are from IMF, Itntertnatiotnal  Finiatncial  Statistics,  various issues; and on 
volumes,  from Bank for International Settlements (1997). 
a. Table uses dollar values of exports and imports. 
trade volume and unit value data apply). In Korea and Malaysia,  export 
volumes  apparently  continued  to  grow  rapidly-at  19  percent  and 
14 percent,  respectively-but  unit values  fell  sharply. In Thailand, by 
contrast,  the volume  of exports stagnated in 1996,  and there was little 
change  in unit values.  Indonesia  is  an intermediate  case,  with  much 
slower  volume  growth than in Korea or Malaysia,  but greater than in 
Thailand. 
One hypothesis holds that there is a new global glut in labor-intensive 
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Asia's  growth in the past generation.27 Such a glut would be reflected 
in slower export earnings in countries with labor-intensive  manufactur- 
ing and declining  terms of trade for labor-intensive  products,  such as 
apparel, footwear,  and consumer  electronics.  World prices for manu- 
factured exports  fell  about 2 percent in  1996.28  Semiconductors  were 
hit especially  hard, with prices estimated to have fallen by as much as 
80 percent in  1996,  before they began to rebound.29 The rapid growth 
in  electronics  production  in  East Asia,  coupled  with  the  addition  of 
China and Mexico  to these  markets (see  below),  probably created ex- 
cess  productive  capacity  and contributed to the decline  in prices.  This 
provides  a plausible  explanation  for the fall  in unit values  of  Korean 
and Malaysian exports, which are substantially composed of electronics 
products. 
A  second,  closely  related,  argument  suggests  that the  economic 
growth of China may have dramatically shifted export-oriented produc- 
tion away from Southeast Asia-as  India's growth might perhaps do in 
the future. From a mere $20 billion  twenty years ago,  China's exports 
had  grown  to  $150  billion  in  1996,  making  it  the  eleventh  largest 
exporter  in  the  world.  Manufactured exports  grew  by  more  than 22 
percent per year, in nominal dollar terms, between  1990 and 1995.  As 
Park and others point out,  competition  from China could be expected 
to exert  downward  pressure on both wages  and export growth  in the 
rest of  the region.30 Indeed,  some  observers  have  directly  linked  the 
1996 decline in Southeast Asian exports to China's effective  50 percent 
devaluation  of the yuan in 1994. 
Chinese  firms compete  directly  against other firms in the region  in 
textiles,  apparel, and electronics,  and in some products they are clearly 
gaining  market share. Consider the group of six  countries comprising 
China and the five crisis economies-Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia,  the 
Philippines,  and Thailand.  Of total exports  from this  group,  China's 
share of garment exports surged from 37 percent in 1990 to 60 percent 
in 1996,  and its share of electronics  exports jumped from 12 percent to 
18 percent over the same period.  Nevertheless,  its overall  role in the 
1996  slowdown  in  Southeast  Asian  exports  was  probably  modest  at 
27.  See, for example, Radelet, Sachs, and Lee (1997). 
28.  International  Monetary  Fund  (1997c). 
29.  Bank for International  Settlements  (1997). 
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best.  China's  export growth also plunged in 1996,  registering  a rather 
anemic rate of just  1.6 percent.  Its textile  exports fell  12 percent,  and 
its  garment  exports  grew  by  only  4  percent.  China's  share  of  total 
manufactured exports  from this group of  countries  was  32 percent in 
1996,  down 2 percentage points from 1994 and exactly  the same as in 
1992.  In other words,  the emergence  of  China  did little  to  displace 
overall manufactured exports from the rest of the region between  1992 
and 1996. The impact of the 1994 devaluation of the yuan was probably 
also  relatively  limited,  since  its  real effect  was  substantially  eroded 
through the gradual nominal appreciation of the yuan and two years of 
inflation averaging  20 percent,  compared with an average of 6 percent 
in the five crisis countries. 
We suggest  a third hypothesis,  relating to the United  States,  which 
remains  the  single  most  important market for the  crisis  countries  of 
Asia.  The  passage  of  NAFTA  and  the  dramatic  surge  of  Mexico's 
exports,  especially  in the wake of the 1994 peso devaluation,  may have 
resulted in intense  new  competition  for East Asia.  Mexico's  total ex- 
ports soared from $52 billion  in 1993 to $96 billion in 1996,  with gains 
in several areas that directly compete with East Asian exports, including 
electronic  machinery,  apparel,  and automotive  components.  As  with 
China,  however,  while  the  effect  was  probably  important in  certain 
sectors,  the overall impact on Asian exports was moderate. 
Table 7 shows export growth rates and shares of total exports for the 
five  Asian  crisis  economies,  China,  and Mexico.  Between  1990  and 
1996, China's share of total exports from these countries grew slightly, 
from 25.8  percent to 27.8  percent, whereas Mexico's  share fell slightly, 
from  11.3  percent to  10.9  percent.  (Mexico's  fall  is partly due to its 
high share in 1990,  as a result of high oil prices during the Gulf War.) 
Relative  to  1992,  China's  share  of  the  total  in  1996  was  about the 
same-that  is,  China's  export growth rate was equal to the weighted 
average  for  the  other  six  countries-while  Mexico's  share  had  in- 
creased. Of the Asian countries,  Indonesia's  and Korea's shares of total 
exports  from the group fell,  whereas  the shares of  Malaysia  and the 
Philippines rose. Thailand's share rose from 9.6 percent in 1990 to 11.0 
percent in 1994,  and then fell  slightly,  to 10.2 percent in 1996.  On the 
whole,  therefore,  the  Asian  countries  were  not  losing  major market 
shares to China and Mexico. 
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Table  7. Export Growth and Export Shares, Selected Countries, 1990-96a 
Percent 
Item  and 
year  China  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Mexico 
Growth  rate of exports 
1990  18.2  15.9  4.2  17.4  4.0  14.9  17.7 
1991  15.8  13.5  10.5  16.8  8.7  23.2  0.7 
1992  18.1  16.6  6.6  18.5  11.2  14.2  1.4 
1993  7.1  8.4  7.3  15.7  13.7  13.3  9.2 
1994  33.1  8.8  16.8  24.7  20.0  22.7  14.2 
1995  22.9  13.4  30.3  26.0  31.6  25.1  40.3 
1996  1.6  9.7  3.7  5.8  16.7  -  1.3  22.6 
Share  of exports  in totalb 
1990  25.8  10.7  27.0  12.2  3.4  9.6  11.3 
1991  26.5  10.7  26.4  12.6  3.2  10.5  10.1 
1992  27.7  11.1  25.0  13.3  3.2  10.6  9.0 
1993  27.1  11.0  24.5  14.1  3.3  11.0  9.0 
1994  29.6  9.8  23.5  14.4  3.3  11.0  8.4 
1995  28.9  8.8  24.3  14.4  3.4  10.9  9.4 
1996  27.8  9.1  23.8  14.4  3.7  10.2  10.9 
Source: IMF, Itnternzationial  Financial Statistics,  various issues. 
a. Numbers refer to nominal exports valued in U.S.  dollars. 
b. Exports of a given country as a percentage of total exports from all seven countries. 
currencies and the yen after 1994 also may have played some role in 
the Asian financial  crisis. Since all of the Southeast  Asian currencies 
were effectively pegged to the dollar, they appreciated  significantly 
against the yen as the yen per dollar rate moved from Y /$85 in June 
1995 to  Y/$127  in April 1997. For example, each 100 yen of Thai 
exports to Japan  brought  in 29 baht in early 1995, but only 20 baht in 
early 1997. Prices  of imports  from  Japan  fell commensurably,  providing 
some benefit to manufacturers  that imported  raw materials and inter- 
mediate goods from Japan. But since the unit values of both exports 
and imports  fell for a wide variety of countries  in 1996 (table 6), one 
can reasonably  conclude  that  the appreciation  of the dollar  pushed  down 
dollar  prices on world  markets  for a wide variety  of goods and  services, 
including East Asian exports to Japan  and Europe. Given that the bulk 
of East Asia's foreign debt is denominated  in dollars, the appreciation 
of the dollar  probably  modestly  increased  the real debt  servicing  burden 
in these countries. 
Each of the factors discussed above no doubt contributed  to the 
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among  creditors  about  the ability of Southeast  Asian firms  to repay  their 
debts. But in the aggregate, the effect appears  to have been modest. In 
contrast  with the Latin  American  debt crises of the 1980s, it is difficult 
to attribute  much weight to the contribution  of international  shocks to 
the East Asian financial  crisis. 
Economic Management  and Asian  Capitalism 
The second major  approach  to explaining  the East Asian crisis holds 
that it was brought  on by weaknesses in Asian economic management. 
This type of hypothesis requires some amplification. As we have ar- 
gued, there clearly were growing weaknesses in the Asian economies 
in the early 1990s, increasing  their economic vulnerability.  Haphazard 
and  partial  financial  liberalization,  coupled  with pegged exchange  rates, 
seem to have made the allocation of investment funds within these 
economies even worse. New banks  and  finance  companies  were allowed 
to operate without supervision or adequate  capitalization. At issue is 
the extent to which these problems were responsible for the capital 
withdrawals,  panic, and  deep economic contraction  that  followed. Even 
if Asian "fundamental  weaknesses" are fully to blame, one must still 
account for the fact that the crisis apparently  was unanticipated;  and, 
related, the continued  high levels of capital inflow into East Asia up to 
the brink  of the crisis. 
One ingenious attempt  to reconcile these factors within an overall 
critique of "Asian capitalism" is the argument  put forward  by Paul 
Krugman  and  Michael  Dooley, that  foreign investors  expected that  they 
would be bailed out as necessary.31  Assume that foreign creditors  lent 
to Asian banks in the expectation that the central banks and the IMF 
would provide the Asian banks with funds to prevent  their collapse in 
the event of a funding crisis. In that case, such foreign credits would 
be safe up to the amount  of the expected  bailout, which might (crudely) 
equal the foreign exchange reserves of a given central bank plus an 
anticipated  sum from the IMF. Thus foreign creditors  would have little 
need for due diligence on the repayment  potential  of the debtor  financial 
institutions. 
To examine this theory, one must check whether  patterns  of lending 
31.  Krugman  (1998); Dooley (1997). McKinnon  and  Pill (1996) also use this frame- 
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within the Asian economies did in fact deteriorate  sharply  in the 1990s 
(in view of the fact that  investment  allocations  were quite successful in 
promoting growth and debt servicing in the 1970s and 1980s) and 
explore patterns  of stock and land prices prior  to the crisis. One should 
also look very closely  at whether foreign investors operated on the 
expectation  that  they would receive bailouts as necessary, or rather,  on 
the expectation  of continued  success in the Asian economies, and  there- 
fore little need for bailouts. Finally, one should examine whether  this 
kind of theory helps to account  for the closely related  crises in Mexico 
and Argentina. 
Table 8 shows shares of commercial bank and financial  institution 
lending by sector for the five Asian crisis economies in 1990 and 1996. 
These data show some signs of a modest shift in lending away from 
manufacturing  activities and toward  construction,  finance, real estate, 
and services. The extent of the shift differs across countries. In Indo- 
nesia the shift is fairly  large, in Malaysia  it is tiny, and  in the Philippines 
it is moderate. In Korea and Thailand there is a very small shift in 
lending by the commercial banks, but a moderate  shift for the other 
financial  institutions. In aggregate, the data do indicate a modest shift 
in lending, but  not a dramatic  surge  into real  estate. These data  probably 
do not accurately  reflect  loan composition, since a customer  could claim 
that a loan will used to expand  manufacturing  capacity  but actually  use 
it to buy property  or equity shares. Moreover,  the shift in annual  (new) 
net lending would be more pronounced  than is indicated  by this table, 
since these data are averages of all outstanding  loans, including older 
loans. 
One indicator  of growing  pressure  in real  estate  markets  is the price  of 
property.  If the crisis countries  had indeed  been in the midst  of a specu- 
lative frenzy, one would expect to see real estate  prices growing  rapidly 
in the  runup  to the  crisis, and  then  crashing.  For  example,  Krugman  argues 
that "in all of the afflicted  countries  there  was a boom-bust  cycle in the 
asset markets  that preceded the currency  crisis: stock and land prices 
soared, then plunged."32  However, the actual  data (which he does not 
report),  give at best mixed support  to this hypothesis. 
Table 9 shows stock and land prices indexes for both Thailand  and 
Indonesia  up to the crisis. In Thailand, stock prices rose very sharply 
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Table  9. Stock and Land Prices, Thailand and Indonesia, 1990-97 
Units  as indicated 
Thailand  Indonesia 
Year  and  Stock  price  Stock  price 
quarter  indexa  Land  priceb  indexa  Land  pricec 
1990:2  439  60.0  92  2,525 
1990:4  308  66.0  56  3,019 
1991:2  406  70.5  45  2,911 
1991:4  392  67.0  33  2,788 
1992:2  449  63.5  41  2,482 
1992:4  529  60.0  33  2,327 
1993:2  554  59.5  44  2,279 
1993:4  1,103  59.5  67  2,402 
1994:2  878  59.8  54  2,358 
1994:4  981  60.5  55  2,358 
1995:2  1,038  60.5  61  2,200 
1995:4  963  60.5  64  2,179 
1996:2  940  60.7  72  2,136 
1996:4  610  60.4  75  2,250 
1997:2  391  43.0  80  2,267 
Source: Data on stock prices are from Datastream's online service.  Data on land prices are provided by Jones Lang 
Wooton. 
a. Main index, in local currency. 
b. Thousands of baht per square meter for "grade A"  office space in Bangkok. 
c.  Dollars per square meter for "grade A"  office space in Jakarta. 
in the early 1990s, fell after 1995, and dropped  sharply  in the second 
half of  1996. Property  prices (indicated by the sale prices of "grade 
A" office space in Bangkok, as rated  by Jones Lang Wooton) showed 
almost no change between 1992 and the end of 1996, but fell sharply 
in early 1997, helping to set off the crisis. What is interesting  is the 
apparent  lack of increase in property  prices between 1992 and 1996. 
There is even less evidence of a boom-bust  pattern  in Indonesia. Stock 
prices rose steadily by about 6 percent  annually  in real terms between 
1992 and  mid-1997, and  did not decline until after  the baht  was floated. 
Land prices were almost exactly the same in June 1997 as they had 
been in June 1993, with no evidence of either a sharp  rise or fall. The 
boom-bust  cycle seems to have been a feature  of the crisis in Thailand- 
and perhaps,  to a lesser degree, in Korea as well-but  it was not so in 
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Table 10. Nonperforming  Loans, Selected Crisis Countries, 1990-96a 
Percent of total loans 
Country  1990  1994  1995  1996 
Indonesia  4.5  12.0  10.4  8.8 
Korea  2.1  1.0  0.9  0.8 
Malaysia  20.4  8.1  5.5  3.9 
Thailand  9.7  7.5  7.7 
Mexico  2.3  10.5  14.4  12.5 
Argentina  16.0  8.6  12.3  9.4 
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1997). 
a. Equivalent data for the Philippines are not available. 
Another  possible indicator  of loan quality  is the share  of nonperform- 
ing loans (NPLs) in total loans. Table 10 shows the share  of NPLs for 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, as well as Mexico and Ar- 
gentina. As with the data on lending by sector, these data should be 
viewed with extreme caution. The numbers are undoubtedly lower 
bounds, since banks probably underreport  NPLs. In any event, bad 
loans generally do not show up during  periods of easy credit, but are 
only uncovered  when credit conditions tighten. In fact, in each of the 
Asian countries in the table, reported  NPLs fell during  the years pre- 
ceding the crisis. In Indonesia, the volume of NPLs peaked in 1993, 
two years after  a dramatic  monetary  tightening  put bank  balance sheets 
under  severe pressure.  As banks  began  to be more  profitable  from 1994, 
many loans were written off.  Indonesia's NPL ratio was also helped 
when Bank Dagang Negara, a large state-owned  bank, cleaned up its 
balance  sheet  preparatory  to listing its shares  publicly. The  World  Bank, 
in a country  report  on Indonesia written in May 1997, just before the 
crisis, noted the decline in NPLs with caution  but stated  that  the "qual- 
ity of commercial  bank portfolios continued  to improve during 1996, 
albeit  slowly.  33 
In Malaysia, the dramatic  drop  in NPLs is probably  due to the com- 
bination of a rapid increase in bank lending and a concerted  effort to 
clean up balance  sheets in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it seems likely 
that loan quality deteriorated  as lending expanded  in the 1990s, espe- 
cially in certain  areas, such as real estate. And in Thailand,  NPLs rose 
sharply  for those financial  institutions  with heavy exposure  to property 
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Table 11. Incremental  Capital-to-Output  Ratios, Selected Countries, 1987-95a 
Ratio 
Country  1987-89  1990-92  1993-95 
Indonesia  4.0  3.9  4.4 
Korea  3.5  5.1  5.1 
Malaysia  3.6  4.4  5.0 
Philippines  3.3  22.8  6.0 
Thailand  2.9  4.6  5.2 
Chile  2.9  3.3  4.4 
Colombia  4.3  4.7  4.1 
India  3.2  6.0  4.7 
Mexico  8.9  6.5  11.7 
Pakistan  2.8  2.9  4.9 
Turkey  6.8  5.4  9.2 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from World Bank, World Developtnenit  Indicators, available on CD-ROM. 
a. Ratio calculated as investment over a given three-year period divided by the change in real GDP during the same 
period, [(1, +  1,  + I +  I, + 2) / (Y,  +  2 -  yt - l ) 
markets  when Bangkok  property  prices fell in early 1997, and  the costs 
of those bad debts mounted  rapidly  in early 1997. However, a dramatic 
deterioration  in loan quality during  the early 1990s throughout  the re- 
gion, as some have suggested, does not show up in the data. 
A crude  macroeconomic  indicator  of the quality  of investment  is the 
incremental capital-to-output  ratio (ICOR)-that  is,  the ratio of the 
value of  new investment to the change in output in a given year. 
Table 11 shows ICORs  for selected emerging markets  over the period 
1987-96.  This measure  has to be viewed with some caution, since it 
does not provide  for necessary  lags between investment  and changes in 
output. Generally speaking, when investment  quality deteriorates,  the 
ICOR increases, as more investment spending is needed to support  a 
given increase in GDP. Investment  rates rose in the five Asian crisis 
economies in the early 1990s, as the increased  capital  inflows added  to 
already high saving to create a large pool of investment funds. Eco- 
nomic growth continued to be brisk, but did not rise commensurably 
with the increase in investment. As can be seen from table 11, ICORs 
accordingly  rose in every country  in the region except the Philippines, 
where economic growth was very slow through 1992. These data can 
be interpreted  to suggest either a decline in investment  quality, dimin- 
ishing returns  to new investment  during  the process of capital deepen- 
ing, or a lag between the heavy investment  spending  in the 1990s and 
an increase in growth. However, similar increases in the ICOR are Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  41 
recorded  for emerging markets  that did not experience crises, such as 
Chile, and much larger  increases are recorded  for Turkey  and Mexico, 
which experienced  crises in 1994 and 1995, respectively. 
How can one reconcile these data with the popular  perceptions  that 
banks were lending recklessly, especially for real estate, in East Asia, 
and that investment quality had sharply deteriorated  during the early 
1990s? We believe that it is a matter  of degree. While we have shown 
that bank  lending was increasing  rapidly, and lending activities almost 
certainly  exceeded prudential  limits in some cases, it is much too easy 
in hindsight to overstate the extent of bad loans. Clearly there were 
many profitable  ongoing investments in manufacturing  activities that 
were earning a solid rate of  return. A  substantial share of lending 
supported  labor-intensive  manufactured  exports, which one does not 
normally  associate with irrational  boom-bust  cycles or gambling. 
Did foreign lenders  believe that  Asia's financial  situation  was unsus- 
tainable, but continue  to lend in the expectation  of an eventual  bailout? 
It is hard to find any generalized perception of an impending major 
problem,  either in the available  data or in statements  and reports  made 
before the crisis. If lenders  had perceived a growing  risk, for example, 
spreads  on Asian bonds  should  have increased.  However, William  Cline 
and  Kevin Barnes  show that  spreads  of both  bonds and  syndicated  loans 
actually fell in emerging markets, including Southeast  Asia, between 
mid-1995 and mid-1997, and the Bank for International  Settlements 
also reports  declining spreads.34  Following the Mexican crisis, it was 
widely believed in Asia that a similar crisis could not happen  there. 
Alternatively, if international  markets  perceived growing risks of a 
crisis and bailout in Asia, ratings of long-term government  bonds by 
Moody's, Standard  and Poor's, and Euromoney  would have declined. 
In fact, these ratings  were either stable or improving  in each of the five 
Asian crisis economies between 1995 and 1997, and did not fall until 
after the onset of the crisis. Even in Thailand, where private investors 
began to be concerned  in late 1996 and  early 1997 when property  prices 
fell, sovereign bond ratings remained  high right up to the float of the 
baht. Indeed, contemporary  reports  and  newsletters  of investment  bank- 
ing firms gave a nuanced  picture. They often pointed out weaknesses 
in the Asian economies (for example, slower export  growth, rapid  loan 
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growth, booming property  markets), but did not give any sense of a 
bubble waiting to burst. Most investment analysts displayed guarded 
confidence  in the prospects  of Southeast  Asia, in both the short  and the 
long runs. 
As to whether investors expected to be bailed out if there were a 
crisis, there is no question that many banks and firms across Asia had 
close government  connections that supported  their profitability.  State- 
owned banks obviously could expect to be bailed out if there were a 
crisis. In Korea, none of the chaebol had been allowed to fail for a 
decade before Hanbo  steel collapsed in early 1997. In Indonesia, firms 
closely connected with the first family or the armed  forces have long 
been given special privileges. And across Asia, infrastructure  projects 
under build-own-operate  or build-own-transfer  relationships, such as 
electric utilities, are generally guaranteed  a revenue stream  from gov- 
ernment  agencies. 
It is hard to make the case,  however, that foreign investors felt 
themselves in a general way to be indemnified  against  risk through  the 
prospect of generous bailouts. A substantial share of funds went to 
equity markets,  where price fluctuations  were indeed risky. Even bank 
loans were heavily concentrated  in the nonfinancial  corporate  sector, 
often with little prospect of a direct government  bailout. Moreover, 
creditors  have long complained  that  weak bankruptcy  laws and ineffec- 
tual judicial systems in Asian countries reduce their ability to collect 
on collateral in the event of nonperforming  loans-that  is, they worry 
that they will not be compensated  if loans go bad. Thus it is probably 
fairer  to say that foreign investors thought  too little about  risk because 
they expected rapid growth and high profitability  to continue, rather 
than because they expected a bailout. 
To summarize,  the combination  of rapid inflows of foreign capital, 
appreciating  real exchange rates, and rapid growth in bank lending 
undoubtedly  led to some deterioration  in the quality of investments  in 
Asia. Lenders  to some well-connected firms and to major  commercial 
banks no doubt felt secure in their positions, confident  that they would 
make a good profit  and that the odds of default were slim. Some-but 
relatively few-observers  saw a major  financial  crisis on the horizon. 
Speculators  certainly  did not smell a kill in Asia in the aftermath  of the 
Mexican peso crisis. There was almost no expectation  of a widespread 
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Financial  Market Instability 
The third approach  to explaining the East Asian crisis holds that it 
was triggered  by dramatic  swings in creditors' expectations about the 
behavior  of other  creditors,  thereby  creating  a self-fulfilling-although 
possibly individually rational-financial  panic. This hypothesis de- 
pends on several underlying  assumptions:  (1) that fundamental  condi- 
tions, though not perfect, were strong enough to sustain reliable debt 
servicing; (2) that needed adjustments  in exchange rates could have 
been carried out in mid-1997 without financial collapse; and (3) that 
foreign exchange and financial  markets  in fact overshot in their initial 
reactions to the panic at the end of 1997. It is consistent with several 
major facts: the role of short-term  debt in the onset of the crisis, the 
unexpected nature of the crisis, the continued rapid lending to Asia 
until the brink of the crisis, and the initial overshooting, as indicated 
by the reversal  of exchange rate and stock indexes from January  1998. 
We have elaborated  the theory  underlying  this view at some length. We 
now show that it is the most successful at accounting  for which emerg- 
ing markets  have succumbed  to financial  crises in recent years. 
To test the relative  strength  of alternative  risk indicators  in predicting 
the onset of a financial  crisis in the emerging  markets  during  the period 
1994-97,  we estimate a simple probit model in which the onset of a 
financial  crisis depends on a vector of economic and institutional  vari- 
ables, including the variables suggested in the discussion above. We 
use a panel of data for the years 1994-97  for twenty-two emerging 
markets. Our left-hand-side variable is a 0-1  indicator, equal to 1 if 
the country  fell into a financial  crisis during  the year  and  to 0 otherwise. 
For these purposes, we define financial crisis as a sharp shift from 
capital inflow to capital outflow from year t- 1 to year t. Nine cases are 
set equal to 1: Turkey and Venezuela in 1994; Argentina  and Mexico 
in 1995; and  Indonesia,  Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,  and  Thailand 
in 1997. Note that after a crisis has occurred, we drop the subsequent 
observations  of the country  (since we suppose that a true  reversal  from 
inflow to outflow can occur only once in the interval). Thus we do not 
include observations  for Turkey and Venezuela over 1995-97,  or ob- 
servations  for Argentina  and Mexico over 1996-97.  In total, we have 
seventy-eight  observations  (22  x  4  -  10 excluded observations). 
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one would predict  that countries  with a high ratio of short-term  debt to 
short-term  assets (measured  as the ratio  of short-term  debt, reported  by 
the Bank  for International  Settlements,  to the foreign  exchange  reserves 
of the central  bank)  would be more vulnerable  to crisis. A high ratio of 
short-term  debt  to reserves  will not necessarily  induce  a crisis in a given 
year, but it is likely to make foreign creditors  realize that there is not 
enough foreign exchange available  to pay off all short-term  creditors  in 
the case of a panic. Alternatively, if one believes that the crisis is a 
matter  of fundamental  solvency, one might expect that total debt out- 
standing,  regardless  of its maturity,  would matter  more  than  short-term 
debt. Therefore  we include as a second possible explanatory  variable 
the ratio of total foreign debt to reserves. 
Our discussion also suggests that countries with a rapid  build-up in 
bank  credit  would  have more  fragile  banking  systems, a greater  quantity 
of bad  loans, and  therefore  greater  vulnerability  to a crisis. Specifically, 
we measure  the ratio of the claims of the financial  sector on the private 
sector relative to GDP, and then calculate the change in that  ratio over 
the preceding  three  years. Countries  with sharply  rising financial  sector 
claims relative to GDP are expected to be more vulnerable  to financial 
crisis. As an alternative  measure (available for only a subset of the 
sample), we use an index of bank strength  based on 1996 ratings of 
commercial banks in each country by Moody's Investors Service, as 
reported  by Barry  Bosworth.3s 
In addition, since some observers claim that large current  account 
deficits lead to crisis, we test the explanatory  power of the ratio of the 
current  account to GDP. The current  account, per se, may not be as 
important  as the capital account, given our focus on capital inflows as 
a key component of the crisis. In each episode, the capital account 
surplus  was even larger  than the current  account  deficit. Therefore  we 
also examine the ratio of the capital account  to GDP. 
We also examine  several  other  variables.  For  example, real exchange 
rate  appreciation  could signal a crisis. We therefore  test the explanatory 
power of an index of the percentage  change in the real exchange rate 
in the previous three years. A rise in the real exchange rate indicates a 
real depreciation. Further,  in the aftermath  of the Asian crisis, many 
observers  have decried widespread  corruption  and crony capitalism  as 
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Table 12. Probit Results Predicting  the Onset of Financial Crisesa 
Independent  variable  (12-1)  (12-2)  (12-3)  (12-4) 
Current  year 
Short-term  foreign  debt/reserves  0.57  0.65  0.75  2.41 
(2.50)t  (2.41)t  (2.36)t  (2.11)t 
Total foreign  debt/reserves  -0.99 
(-  1.49) 
Freedom  from  corruptionb  -0.36  -0.39  -0.36 
(-1.14)  (-1.24)  (-1.04) 
Lagged  one year 
Private  credit  buildupc  3.22  2.48  3.46  4.05 
(2.31)t  (2.34)t  (1.87)*  (2.38)t 
Capital  inflow/GDP  3.79  4.03  2.69 
(1.85)*  (2.09)t  (0.97) 
Current  account  surplus/GDP  -  14.63 
(-  1.55) 
Real  exchange  rate  changed  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01 
(-0.26)  (-0.14)  (-0.59) 
Constant  -2.44  -1.42  -1.73  1.56 
(-4.91)t  (-1.20)  (-1.38)  (-1.17) 
Summary  statistic 
Pseudo  R2  0.24  0.28  0.33  0.37 
N  78  78  78  78 
Source: Authors' regressions. Data on short-term debt are from Bank for International  Settlements (1998); on total debt, 
from World Bank, World  Developtnent Indicators, available on CD-ROM; on reserves, private credit, GDP, exchange rates, 
and capital inflow,  from IMF, Internatiotnal  Fitnatncial  Statistics,  various issues; and on corruption, from Political Risk 
Services (various issues). 
a. Dependent variable is a dummy, set equal to I for a given country in year t if that country experiences a sharp switch 
from capital inflow (in year t- l)  to capital outflow (in year t). The panel comprises the twenty-two emerging markets listed 
in table 14 over 1994-97;  but once a country experiences a crisis,  it is excluded from the panel in all subsequent years. z 
statistics are in parentheses. Significance at the 10 percent level is denoted by *; at the 5 percent level,  by t. 
b. Index of corruption ranges from I to 6, where a lower score indicates greater corruption. 
c.  Three-year change (t-4 to t-l)  in the ratio of financial system claims on the private sector to GDP. 
d. Three-year percent change (t-4 to t- l).  An increase represents a depreciation. For details of calculation, see table 2, 
note c. 
an  underlying  cause.  To  test  this  idea,  we  include  a  cross-country 
comparative  index  of corruption,  as judged by a leading political  risk 
advisory  service.  The  corruption  index  is  measured  on  a scale  from 
1 to 6,  with  1 indicating  the most corruption. 
Regression  results are shown in table 12. As expected,  a higher ratio 
of short-term debt to reserves is strongly associated  with the onset of a 
crisis.  The  estimated  coefficient  is  positive  and  significant  at the  5 
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Table 13. Means and Standard Deviations  of Variables  Used in Probit Regressionsa 
Units  as indicated 
Subsamplea 
Variable  Crisis  observations  Noncrisis  observations 
Current  year 
Short-term  foreign  debt/reserves  1.82  0.99 
(1.40)  (1.01) 
Total  foreign  debt/reserves  2.31  2.17 
(0.78)  (3.06) 
Freedom  from  corruptionb  3.22  3.60 
(0.67)  (0.91) 
Lagged  one year 
Private  credit  buildupc  0.17  0.04 
(0.21)  (0.20) 
Capital  inflow/GDP  0.07  0.03 
(0.02)  (0.18) 
Current  account  surplus/GDP  -0.05  -0.02 
(0.02)  (0.07) 
Real  exchange  rate  changed  -  15.82  -  15.92 
(8.42)  (27.21) 
Source: see table 12. 
a. Panel of country years is partioned according to whether the crisis dummy is equal to 0 or 1; for details, see table 12, 
note a. Standard  deviations are in parentheses. 
b.  Index of corruption ranges from 1 to 6,  where a lower score indicates greater corruption. 
c.  Three-year change (t-4 to t-l)  in the ratio of financial system claims on the private sector to GDP. 
d. Three-year percent change (t-4 to t-l).  An increase represents a depreciation. For details of calculation, see table 2, 
note c. 
the regressors,  shows  that the debt-to-reserves  ratio averages  1.82  in 
the nine crisis  episodes  and 0.99  in the noncrisis  episodes.  Table  14 
gives  the values  of the regressors by country.  Note that in eight of the 
nine crisis episodes,  the ratio of debt to reserves exceeded  0.8  (the only 
exception  is Malaysia,  with a ratio of 0.61).  This value is exceeded  by 
only  three of  the thirteen noncrisis  economies:  Russia,  South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe.  It is possible  to have  a high  level  of  short-term debt 
without entering  a crisis-the  Asian  countries  generally  escaped  con- 
tagion from Mexico  in 1995-but  it does seem to indicate vulnerability 
to a crisis. 
The ratio of  total  debt to reserves,  by  contrast,  is  not  statistically 
associated  with a crisis (equation  12-4); this result holds up even when 
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to  reserves  is  slightly  larger in the crisis  countries  (2.3)  than in the 
noncrisis  countries  (2.2),  but the  difference  is  small.  This  evidence 
strongly suggests  that these are indeed crises of liquidity,  not solvency. 
A rapid buildup in the claims  of the financial  sector on the private 
sector is also associated  with crises.  The estimated coefficient  is posi- 
tive and significant  at the 5 percent level  in three of the four specifica- 
tions.  The ratio of claims to GDP increased by  17 percentage points in 
the crisis economies  in the three years prior to the observation,  but by 
only 4 percentage points in the noncrisis countries.  Thus there is some 
evidence  to support the notion that it is the buildup of bank claims that 
leaves  the financial system weakened  and vulnerable to attack. Never- 
theless,  one should remember that in Mexico  in 1994 and in Indonesia 
in  1997,  the short-term debt problems  lay mostly  outside  the banking 
systems:  with the government  in the former case,  and with the nonfi- 
nancial corporate sector in the latter. 
A larger current account  deficit  is only  weakly  associated  with the 
onset  of  a crisis.  In equation  12-3,  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the 
current account is of the correct sign but is insignificant at the 10 percent 
level.  As can be seen from table  13, current account deficits  averaged 
5 percent of GDP in the crisis episodes,  compared with 2 percent in the 
noncrisis episodes.  But the stronger relationship between crises and the 
capital account ratio is shown in equations  12-1,  12-2,  and 12-4.  This 
seems  reasonable,  since  the pressures  are created by capital  inflows, 
rather than the trade and current account deficits per se.  However,  the 
relationship  is not as strong as with short-term debt or the increase  in 
banking sector claims. 
Somewhat  surprisingly,  our measure of real exchange  rate overval- 
uation  does  not  seem  to  be  associated  with  financial  crisis.  In each 
specification,  the estimated  coefficient  on the change  in the real ex- 
change  rate is  close  to  zero  and is  insignificant.  There  is  almost  no 
difference  in the average change  in the real exchange  rate in the pre- 
vious  three  years  between  the  crisis  (-  15.8  percent)  and noncrisis 
(-  15.9  percent)  episodes.  Finally,  the level  of corruption is not sig- 
nificantly associated  with financial crises,  even after controlling  for the 
level  of  short-term debt,  bank credit,  and other variables.  While  the 
estimated  coefficient  is of the correct sign,  it is not significant  at con- 
ventional  levels.  There  is  little  difference  in  the  level  of  perceived 
corruption in the crisis and noncrisis economies:  the corruption indexes Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  49 
average  3.2  and  3.6,  respectively.  To  put  it  another  way,  there  is 
extensive  corruption in East Asia,  but so too in other emerging markets 
that did not fall  prey to  financial  crisis;  corruption does  not  seem  to 
have been the driving force of the East Asian crisis. 
Our simple  probit technique is obviously  limited.  The variables are 
no  doubt  measured  with  significant  error. Not  all  emerging  markets 
crises  can be lumped into a single  model.  And yet,  the cross-country 
evidence  is highly  suggestive:  the defining element  of  such crises  has 
been  the vulnerability  to panic,  as measured by  high ratios  of  short- 
term debt to reserves.  A rapid buildup of bank claims is also predictive. 
Measures of foreign borrowing per se-whether  the total stock of debt 
or the flow  current account deficit-are  less  important. Corruption is 
rife in emerging markets, but corruption does not necessarily  signal the 
demise  of an economy. 
The IMF Response to the East Asian Crisis 
The official  international response to the East Asian financial crisis, 
led primarily by the IMF, has evolved  over time.  A dividing  line was 
reached at the end of December  1997,  when the mechanisms  and goals 
originally  envisioned  by the IMF were altered in view  of rapid change 
in market outcomes.  Thus our analysis distinguishes  two phases in crisis 
management: August  1997 to December  24,  1997,  and December  24, 
1997 to the present (April  1998). 
Phase  One 
The  International Monetary  Fund signed  three emergency  lending 
agreements  with  Thailand  in  August  1997,  Indonesia  in  November 
1997,  and Korea in December  1997.  These three programs established 
an unprecedented sum of international financial support: $17 billion for 
Thailand,  $35  billion  for Indonesia,  and $57  billion  for Korea.  The 
financing  commitments  under these  agreements  are detailed  in table 
15.36 However,  these figures overstate the amount of funding that was 
actually made available.  In both Indonesian and Korean packages,  $22 
36.  Note that  although  the Indonesian  program  was officially counted  as $40 billion, 
$5 billion of this sum represented  Indonesia's  own money. ON  _ 
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billion were "second line of defense" funds from individual donor 
governments  (mainly the United States, Japan,  Singapore, and the Eu- 
rope countries), with relatively  little likelihood of being available  early 
in the program.  The rest of the money was to be disbursed  over a three- 
year period, according  to a preestablished  schedule, so that only some 
of these funds  could be made  available  early in the adjustment  program. 
The three loan agreements  were similar in basic design. Each in- 
volved the following elements: 
-a  package  of loans to the central  bank and government  that could 
be drawn  on, directly or indirectly, to support  the repayment  of debts 
falling due to international  creditors  and to stabilize exchange rates; 
-a  macroeconomic  framework  based on budget  balance  or surplus, 
and high nominal interest  rates and restrictive  domestic credit targeted 
at exchange rate stability; 
-a  program  of drastic financial sector restructuring,  based on im- 
mediate closure or suspension  of several financial  institutions  and sig- 
nificant  intensification  of financial  sector supervision  in various forms; 
-other  ''good governance" and "structural" measures aimed at 
increasing the transparency and competitiveness  of the economic 
system, including accelerated trade reform, demonopolization, and 
privatization. 
The IMF's immediate  objective was to reestablish  financial  market 
confidence, in particular,  by stabilizing the exchange rate. Exchange 
rate stabilization  was to be based on a combination  of macroeconomic 
discipline (fiscal balance, high interest rates, tight credit), increased 
availability of foreign exchange reserves, and confidence that funda- 
mental economic reforms were moving forward. Such reforms would 
be signaled by decisive actions at the start of the program  to close or 
suspend  loss-making  financial  institutions,  as well as the announcement 
of a strict timetable of longer term measures  regarding  financial  mar- 
kets, corporate  governance, and increased  market  competition in var- 
ious areas. 
The mechanics of the IMF loans merit special attention. The three 
packages  differed somewhat,  both in the letter  and in the application  of 
the agreements.  As noted above, in all cases, the loan packages  had the 
direct function of providing the central bank with reserves to support 
the repayment  of debts falling due, while limiting the adverse effects 
of such repayments  on the exchange rate. In the case of Korea, the 52  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
linkage between the loan package and the repayment  of foreign debts 
was direct and fairly automatic. In early December the commercial 
banks simply notified the Bank of Korea of the daily foreign creditor 
demands for foreign exchange loan repayments. The Bank of Korea 
then credited  these banks with the necessary foreign exchange. In this 
way, the foreign  creditors  were repaid  out of the IMF  loan package;  the 
Bank of Korea became the creditor of the Korean commercial banks 
and the debtor  of the IMF. The upside of this arrangement  was that  the 
original  loans were repaid  and default  was avoided. The downside  was 
that the original  private  loans were in effect socialized. If the original 
loans had  been allowed  to default,  the foreign  creditors  and  the owners  of 
the Korean  banks  would  have shared  the bulk  of the losses.37  Instead,  the 
foreign  creditors  were allowed  to escape  and  the Korean  government  took 
over the burden  of repaying  the foreign  debts-now  owed to the IMF. 
Thailand presents a case similar to Korea. The central bank made 
credits available to financial institutions to support  the repayment  of 
foreign  debts. Moreover,  in January  1998 the government  made  explicit 
its guarantees  on all bank liabilities, including debts owed to foreign 
creditors,  thereby  effectively pledging foreign  exchange reserves  to the 
servicing of bank debts. 
In Indonesia, by contrast, most of the short-term  debts were owed 
by nonfinancial  corporations,  which were not entitled to direct credit 
lines from Bank  Indonesia.  The IMF  loans therefore  could only support 
repayments  indirectly, by allowing Bank Indonesia  to intervene  in the 
foreign exchange market  to provide  dollars  at a cheaper  rate  than  would 
otherwise have been available, thus reducing the rupiah  cost of serv- 
icing the debts. 
The IMF has emphasized  that  the lending packages  were intended  to 
support  stabilization, not merely to bail out foreign financial institu- 
tions. It hoped that its role as a quasi lender of last resort  would suffi- 
ciently restore  market  confidence  that  the Asian governments  would not 
need to draw down the full package of loans. If exchange rates could 
be stabilized and default avoided, the thinking  presumably  ran, private 
lending would revive. In addition, the IMF clearly feared  that outright 
default in Asia would trigger a massive upheaval in other emerging 
37.  The Korean  government  might still have borne  some of the losses if the Korean 
banks  had become fully insolvent, since the repayment  of the domestic deposits in the 
insolvent banks  would probably  have required  public rescue funds. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  53 
Figure 4. Korea: Policy Events and the Exchange  Rate, July 1997 to March  1998a 
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markets.  Therefore,  even if the loan packages  did little more  than  repay 
creditors  and forestall default in Asia, they might have important  sal- 
utary  effects in other emerging markets. 
During  the period  August 1997 to December  1997, the IMF  programs 
failed dramatically  to restore market  confidence. Figures 4 to 9 show 
the movements  of exchange rates and stock markets  in Indonesia, Ko- 
rea, and Thailand  in the aftermath  of the IMF agreements.  In all three 
countries,  the exchange  rate  was expected  to stabilize  but  in fact quickly 
depreciated far below the targets set in the program, despite a very 
sharp  increase  in interest  rates. Foreign  investors  remained  unconvinced 
about the debt servicing capacity of the private  debtors  and continued 
to demand  the repayment  of short-term  loans as they fell due. Official 
reserves fell more rapidly than the IMF had predicted. In the case of 
Korea, the withdrawal  of short-term  debts was so much more intense 54  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Figure  5. Thailand:  Policy Events and the Exchange  Rate, July 1997 to March 1998a 
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than allowed for in the program  implemented  on December 3 that the 
country  faced imminent  default  by December  24. Indeed, on December 
22 Moody's downgraded  the sovereign debts of all three countries to 
junk bond status. 
The basic goals of  IMF programs, enunciated in article 1 of  its 
Articles of Agreement, include "to give confidence to members by 
making  the general  resources  of the Fund  temporarily  available  to them 
under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity  to 
correct  maladjustments  in their balance of payments  without resorting 
to measures destructive of national or international  prosperity." The 
most important  measure  of the failure  of the IMF  programs  in East Asia 
thus lies in the outcomes on economic growth  shown in table 16. Since 
the launch of these programs, actual outcomes in each country have 
been far worse than projected. The IMF has repeatedly  been forced to Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  55 
Figure  6. Indonesia:  Policy  Events  and  the Exchange  Rate,  July 1997  to March  1998a 
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reduce its growth forecasts for 1998.  And the much lower revised 
forecasts are still much more optimistic than those of private  forecast- 
ers. When  pressed  on this point, IMF  officials answer  that  their  original 
forecasts were built on best case assumptions.  But there is much more 
to it than that: as discussed below, the IMF's own responses added to 
the risks of a sharply  contractionary  outcome. 
Phase  Two 
The management  of the East Asian financial crisis entered a new 
phase on December 24, 1997. With Korea on the brink  of default, the 
U.S. government  (led by the Federal  Reserve  Board  and  the U.S. Treas- 
ury) decided to press foreign commercial  banks  to roll over their short- 
term credits to that country on an enforced basis, rather  than waiting 
for market  confidence to be restored. The banks and the Korean  gov- 
ernment  initially announced  a standstill on debt servicing, pending a 
formal agreement. On January 16,  1998, they agreed to a complete 
rollover of all short-term  debts falling due in the first quarter  of 1998. 56  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Figure  7. Korea:  Policy  Events  and  Stock  Prices,  July  1997  to March  1998a 
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On January 28,  an agreement  was  reached  to  convert  $24  billion  in 
short-term debt  to  claims  with  maturities  of  between  one  and three 
years.  The IMF, with the backing of the United States,  insisted on the 
comprehensive  debt rollover  as a condition  for further disbursements 
under the  IMF  lending  package-in  fact,  those  disbursements  were 
accelerated  as  part of  the  new  arrangement.  In  one  sense,  the  new 
arrangement represented the failure of the conception  embodied  in the 
original loan programs for the Asian crisis economies.  Rather than using 
a loan package in combination with economic  reforms to restore market 
confidence,  the new arrangement meant a nonmarket postponement  of 
debts falling  due,  albeit ratified by market participants in a collective 
undertaking. 
The new  arrangements put a brake on the fall  of  the Korean won, 
and also  on the decline  in stock  markets of  all three crisis  countries. 
The currencies  of Thailand and Indonesia,  however,  continued  to de- 
preciate  for  several  more  weeks.  The  depreciation  of  the  Thai  baht Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  57 
Figure  8. Thailand:  Policy  Events  and  Stock  Prices,  July  1997  to March  1998a 
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seems  to have ended  around January 21,  1998,  when the government 
formalized  its  guarantee  of  all  liabilities  owed  by  Thai  commercial 
banks,  including  those  to  foreign  creditors.  The  clarification  of  such 
state guarantees on what had been private sector debts,  in combination 
with  other policy  actions  and the improvements  in Korea,  initiated  a 
period of currency appreciation. In the meantime,  Thai corporate debts 
owed to foreign creditors fell into partial suspension,  although system- 
atic data on the extent of debt servicing  by nonfinancial corporate bor- 
rowers are not available. 
In Indonesia the situation became  more chaotic,  rather than less,  in 
the early weeks of January 1998. The critical turning point was January 
6,  when  the government  announced  its proposed  budget  for the new 
fiscal year (that is,  starting April 1). The budget called for a 32 percent 
increase  in spending,  in nominal rupiah terms.  The proposal immedi- 
ately  was  strongly  denounced  by  the  U.S.  Treasury and the  IMF  as 
being inconsistent  with the loan program, signaling  that Indonesia was 58  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Figure 9. Indonesia: Policy Events and Stock Prices, July 1997 to March 1998a 
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not serious in implementing that program. Since the IMF loan program 
was confidential,  these  claims  could  not be independently  verified by 
outsiders and the markets plummeted.  In the event,  the statements from 
Washington turned out to have been too hasty. The increased spending 
was  entirely  due  to  pass  through effects  of  the  depreciation;  in real 
terms,  the budget  represented  a reduction  in  spending.  Several  days 
later, Stanley Fischer from the IMF was quoted as saying that the new 
budget was  "not  as bad as it was portrayed,"  and within a few  weeks 
the IMF had approved a budget with a 46 percent increase in spending.38 
By that time,  however,  the damage had been done. 
On January 15 the Indonesian government and the IMF signed a new 
agreement,  revising  that of  November  1,  1997.  In this case,  the new 
agreement did not reflect a new  strategy-there  was neither a consoli- 
38.  "IMF's Fischer Says Indonesia  Budget Not as Bad as Portrayed,"  worldwide 
web page of Bloomberg,  January  8, 1998. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs  59 
Table 16. IMF and Market GDP Growth Rate Forecasts  for Indonesia, Korea, 
and Thailand 
Percent 
Growth  forecast 
Country  andforecast source  Date  1997  1998 
Indonesia 
IMF, first  program  Oct. 31, 1997  5.0  3.0 
IMF, second  program  Jan. 15, 1998  0.0 
IMF, third  program  Apr. 10, 1998  -5.0 
IMF, World  Economic  Outlook  Apr. 1998  -5.0 
Market  forecast  Feb. 1998  -8.8 
Korea 
IMF, first  program  Dec. 4, 1997  6.0  2.5 
IMF, third  program  Feb. 7, 1998  1.0 
IMF, World  Economic  Outlook  Apr. 1998  -0.8 
Market  forecast  Feb. 1998  -2.5 
Thailand 
IMF, first  program  Aug. 20, 1997  2.5  3.5 
IMF, second  program  Nov. 25, 1997  0.6  0.0 to 1.0 
IMF, third  program  Feb. 24, 1998  -3.0  to - 3.5 
IMF, World  Economic  Outlook  Apr. 1998  -3.1 
Market  forecast  Feb. 1998  -6.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund forecasts are from various IMF press releases and IMF (1998c).  Market forecast is 
a simple average of forecasts by Goldman Sachs and two other investment banks operating in the region. 
dated rollover of private sector debts, as in Korea, nor a public guar- 
antee of bank liabilities, as in Thailand. It simply intensified  the pre- 
viously agreed  strategy,  based on the IMF  loan package  and  accelerated 
structural  reforms. Once again, the strategy failed to revive market 
confidence. The markets  in fact reacted  negatively to the new package, 
with further  declines in the exchange rate. 
The turn toward a modicum of financial  market  stabilization  in In- 
donesia came two weeks later, with two policy announcements  by the 
government:  first, a de facto suspension  of payments  on short-term  debt; 
and second, the guarantee  of all commercial bank liabilities, both to 
foreign and domestic depositors  and other creditors.  Despite consider- 
able other turmoil  during  the following weeks-including  the govern- 
ment's flirtation with a currency board, the reelection of President 
Suharto, and the replacement  of the cabinet-the  steep decline of the 
rupiah  was halted. The announced  suspension  of debt  payments,  in one 
sense, merely confirmed  the actual  state  of affairs, since most corporate 60  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
debts were not being repaid. Nonetheless, the recognition that debt 
payments  could in fact be delayed without  a punitive  response  from the 
IMF calmed the markets. The Indonesian  government  announced  that 
it would establish a framework  for the orderly negotiation  of debt re- 
structuring,  but such a framework  has yet to be implemented. 
On Friday,  April 10, 1998, Indonesia  signed its third  agreement  with 
the IMF in six months. This agreement  did include provisions on re- 
structuring  private  sector foreign debt and a more comprehensive  strat- 
egy for reorganizing  the commerical  banks. It also eased requirements 
on fiscal stringency  and  the timetable  for removing  subsidies. The initial 
market  reaction  was favorable,  and  the rupiah  had  appreciated  6 percent 
by the following Monday. 
It is important  to note that the achievement  of currency  market  sta- 
bility across the region during the first quarter  of  1998 (and nominal 
appreciation,  in the cases of Korea and Thailand)  came in conjunction 
with the relaxation  of IMF fiscal targets. The IMF has relented on its 
goal of fiscal surpluses  in 1998, and under  the revised programs,  each 
country  will aim for modest fiscal deficits. The currency  markets  have 
demonstrated  that exchange rate movements are not closely linked to 
the realization  of budget surpluses. 
While the IMF did not formally articulate  a change of strategy  after 
December 1997, certain  new principles  in its management  of the crisis 
are clear: 
-partial  suspension of foreign debt payments, based on collective 
agreements  between creditors and debtors (as in Korea) or unilateral 
actions to be followed by creditor-debtor  negotiations  (as in Indonesia); 
-government  guarantees of  all bank liabilities-in  contrast, for 
example, to the original program  for Indonesia, which protected  only 
small depositors  in the banks that were closed; 
-reduced  focus on bank closures in the short  term and more focus 
on longer  run  restructuring  and  bank  recapitalization-for example, the 
IMF dropped  a demand for further  bank closures in Indonesia that it 
had tabled in discussions in early January;  and, 
-the  abandonment  of fiscal surplus  targets. 
Some principles, though, remain unchanged, in particular,  the tar- 
geting of exchange rate stability  through  high interest  rates and  restric- 
tive domestic credit policies; and the implementation  of a wide range 
of structural  measures  in finance, trade, and corporate  governance. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey  D. Sachs  61 
Why Did  the Original IMF Programs  Fail? 
The Asian countries were suffering an extreme contraction  of eco- 
nomic activity in early 1998, despite the commitment  of $1 10 billion 
in emergency  international  support.  The IMF  programs  failed to achieve 
their  goal of maintaining  moderate  economic growth  in these countries. 
They also failed in several intermediate  goals, including the preserva- 
tion of creditworthiness,  the continuation  of debt payments, and the 
stabilization  of exchange  rates  at the levels prevailing  when the original 
lending agreements  were signed. It is crucial to understand  what went 
wrong in order  both to redesign  these programs  most effectively and to 
prepare  for future  international  support  efforts in other countries. 
In the simplest terms, the IMF was not able to reestablish market 
confidence in time to prevent  the collapse of debt servicing or achieve 
the early stabilization of exchange rates. In our view, there are five 
reasons for that failure. First, the IMF is rather  poorly placed to rally 
market  confidence  in the short  term,  under  any  circumstances.  Its arrival 
gives all the confidence of seeing an ambulance  outside one's door. 
Second, the IMF greatly  amplified  the jitters that  it naturally  creates  by 
declaring-both  for the purpose  of negotiation  and in reflection  of the 
substantive  beliefs of the institution-that the East  Asian financial  crisis 
was mainly the result of deep fundamental  weaknesses, rather  than a 
self-fulfilling panic among creditors. In regard  to Korea, for example, 
the IMF argues that "while the contagion effects of developments  in 
Southeast Asia contributed  to the current crisis, the magnitude and 
speed of deterioration  in the financial  situation  owed much to the fun- 
damental  weaknesses in Korea's financial  and corporate  sectors."39 
Third, the IMF's approach  to restoring  market  confidence  was based 
on a very peculiar  hypothesis:  that tough action on restructuring  finan- 
cial markets-including closing financial  institutions,  tightening  regu- 
latory standards,  and the like-would  reassure  creditors  so much that 
they would roll over their  short-term  claims as they fell due. The official 
press release from the IMF announcing  the first program  for Thailand 
declared:  "At the heart  of the strategy  has been the up-front  separation, 
suspension, and restructuring  of unviable  institutions,  immediate  steps 
to instill confidence  in the rest of the financial  system, strict  condition- 
ality on the extension of FIDF [Financial Institutions Development 
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Fund] resources,  and the phased implementation  of broader structural 
reforms to restore a healthy  financial  sector.  Recognizing  that the fi- 
nancial  system  will  face  deteriorating  conditions  for  some  time,  the 
authorities will require all remaining financial institutions to strengthen 
their capital  base  expeditiously."40  We  have  discussed  at length  the 
problems  that existed  in many banks and financial  institutions  across 
the region and the consequent  need for reform. The key issues  are how 
to introduce such reforms and over what time frame,  especially  in the 
midst of an incipient  creditor panic. 
There is no reason to believe  that closing  banks and finance compa- 
nies and tightening  supervisory standards would in fact restore market 
confidence  in the middle of a panic,  in the sense of stemming demands 
for  the  repayment  of  short-term debts.  Indeed,  the  logic  of  creditor 
panics  is  the opposite:  the sudden realization  that a bank will  not be 
bailed out by a lender of last resort can easily  incite a panic that would 
not have arisen.  Charles Kindleberger points out that decisive  regula- 
tory actions  have often triggered panics rather than calm: 
Apart from lags and mistakes of discount policy, the authorities  may 
precipitate  panic by brusque action in early stages of distress. In the 
summer  of 1836, with credit  extended  in acceptances  drawn  by American 
houses on British joint-stock banks, the Bank of  England refused to 
discount  any bills bearing  the name  of a joint-stock  bank  and specifically 
instructed  its Liverpool  agent not to rediscount  any paper  of the three  so- 
called "W banks" (Wiggins, Wildes, and Wilson) among the seven 
American  banks in Britain, an action that "seemed vindictive" and led 
immediately to panic. As it turned out, the Bank of England had to 
reverse its policies.  It had long conferences with the "W banks" in 
October,  extended  them lines of discount  in the first  quarter  of 1837, but 
failed to prevent  their failure in June of that year. The Bank's instinct 
was right: to frustrate  the extension of dangerous  credit. But credit is a 
delicate thing. Expectations  can quickly be altered. Something, some- 
times almost  nothing, causes a shadow  to fall on credit, reversing  expec- 
tations-and  the rush  for liquidity  is on.41 
The IMF's  actions  in Indonesia  were particularly egregious.  Under 
the  program of  November  1,  1997,  sixteen  commercial  banks  were 
40.  "IMF Approves  Stand-By  Credit  for Thailand," International  Monetary  Fund 
Press Release 97/37, August 20, 1997, p. 3. 
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suddenly closed  with the explicit  proviso that deposits  over 20 million 
rupiah (the equivalent  of  approximately  $5,000  at the time)  would be 
unprotected.  The IMF does  seem to have been aware of the risk of the 
policies:  "During  this process  of  financial sector restructuring,  a key 
objective  will  be  to  ensure  that confidence  in  the  remainder  of  the 
banking system  is maintained.  The authorities are mindful of the risk 
that bank closures  could induce a run on other healthy institutions. "42 
In the event,  the bank closures  provoked a financial panic and a run on 
the entire private sector banking system  other than foreign-owned  in- 
stitutions.  As the IMF dryly observed  in January 1998: 
Following the closure of  16 insolvent banks in November last year, 
customers  concerned  about  the safety of private  banks  have been shifting 
sizeable amounts  of deposits  to state and  foreign  banks, while some have 
been withdrawing  funds from the banking system entirely. .  .  . These 
movements in deposits have greatly complicated  the task of monetary 
policy, because they have led to a bifurcation  of the banking  system. By 
mid-November,  a large number  of banks were facing growing liquidity 
shortages, and were unable to obtain sufficient funds in the interbank 
market  to cover this gap, even after paying interest  rates ranging  up to 
75 percent. At the same time, another  smaller group of banks [that is, 
the state  and  foreign  banks]  were becoming  increasingly  liquid, and  were 
trading  among themselves at a relatively low JIBOR  (Jakarta  Interbank 
Offer Rate) of about 15 percent. As this segmentation  continued  to in- 
crease, while the stress  on the banking  system  intensified,  Bank  Indonesia 
was compelled  to act. It provided  banks  in distress  with liquidity  support, 
while withdrawing  funds from banks  with excess liquidity, thereby  rais- 
ing JIBOR to over 30 percent in early December, where it has since 
remained.  .  .  Nevertheless, despite this increase in interest rates-to 
levels higher than in any other country  in the region-the  problems  of 
the rupiah  have only intensified.43 
Across  the region,  even  relatively  strong banks came under intense 
pressure as foreign  creditors refused to roll over loans  and depositors 
fled to state and foreign  owned  banks.  By  January 1998,  the banking 
systems of Indonesia,  Korea, and Thailand had nearly ground to a halt. 
Foreign  banks stopped  accepting  letters of  credit written by banks in 
these countries,  and firms had difficulty in finding new banks to service 
42.  International  Monetary  Fund  (1997a, p. 18). 
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their needs. Ironically, even exporters  were badly affected, despite the 
potential for increased profitability  from the exchange rate deprecia- 
tions. There  were widespread  reports  of exporters  with confirmed  orders 
being unable to obtain needed trade credits because banks were not 
making  new loans. In Thailand,  exports  in January  1998 were 8 percent 
below the level of January  1997. Prime  Minister  Chuan  Leekpai  attrib- 
uted the problem  to the banking  sector, noting that "the major  problem 
we are facing with regard  to exports is that of liquidity. The banks are 
charging  high interest rates, and some banks do not have the funds to 
make loans."44 For similar reasons, Indonesian shoe manufacturers 
appealed to their government  for emergency credits. Despite an esti- 
mated $1 billion in confirmed  export orders  for the first six months of 
1998, these firms  were unable  to arrange  for the working  capital  credits 
to import  the inputs-representing roughly  60 percent  of the final price 
of exports-needed  to produce  the shoes. 
The fourth reason why the IMF failed to achieve confidence and 
exchange rate stability in East Asia involves its approach  to fiscal and 
monetary  policy. The IMF put great emphasis on the need for strong 
fiscal contraction  in order  to ensure  a fiscal surplus  in 1998, even though 
the crisis countries  were already  hit hard  by the contractionary  force of 
the withdrawal  of foreign credits. We have noted that Thailand was 
asked to take fiscal contractionary  adjustments  equal to approximately 
2.6 percent  of GDP (from a deficit of 1.6 percent  of GDP in fiscal year 
1996-97  to a surplus of  1 percent of GDP in fiscal year 1997-98); 
Indonesia was required  to take fiscal contractionary  actions equal to 1 
percent of GDP in fiscal year 1997-98 and 2 percent  of GDP in fiscal 
year 1998-99; and Korea  was asked  to take adjustment  measures  equal 
to 1.5 percent  of GDP in 1998-99.  The IMF asserted  that such adjust- 
ments were a core component of  the confidence-building  measures 
needed for currency stabilization. Yet there is no evidence that the 
currency  markets  reacted at all favorably  to the fiscal surplus  targets. 
They certainly did not react adversely when the IMF eased the fiscal 
targets in early 1998. 
The monetary  targets are a more conventional  approach  to financial 
stabilization. The IMF used interest rates both as instruments  and as 
44.  Quoted in Peter Montagnon,  "Export  Slowdown Hits Thai Recovery," Finan- 
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intermediate  targets.  Most  macroeconomists  share  the view that  increas- 
ing interest rates will help to support  currency stabilization, but this 
basic proposition  becomes problematical-even  doubtful-in  the con- 
text of an extreme  creditor  panic. Kindleberger's  survey  of past manias 
and crashes makes clear that interest rate increases can actually work 
against  currency  stabilization  under  these circumstances:  "Tight money 
in a given financial  center can serve either to attract  funds or to repel 
them, depending  on the expectations  that a rise in interest  rates gener- 
ates. With inelastic expectations-no  fear of crisis or of currency  de- 
preciation-an  increase in the discount  rate attracts  funds from abroad 
and helps to provide the cash needed to ensure liquidity; with elastic 
expectations of change-of  falling prices, bankruptcies,  or exchange 
depreciation-raising  the discount rate may suggest to foreigners the 
need to take more funds out rather  than bring new funds in."45 The 
point is not just a theoretical curiosity: the experience of the Asian 
currencies  in the second half of 1997 gives direct empirical  support. 
Consider  the case of Indonesia  in the lead-up to its initial IMF pro- 
gram of November 1,  1997. At the time, the IMF noted that "the 
downward  pressure  on the rupiah  has persisted  despite  policy measures 
that, by and large, have been timely and broadly  appropriate.  [In Au- 
gust] liquidity conditions in domestic money markets  were tightened 
significantly  with one month interest rates on central  bank certificates 
. . . being increased  from 1 1/2  percent  to 30 percent  on August 19." 
Fiscal policy was also tightened.  The IMF  went on to observe, however, 
that "this policy response  initially  had a salutary  effect on the exchange 
rate, but this respite did not last long.  The tightening of monetary 
conditions  transferred  market  pressures  to the domestic economy, put- 
ting heavy strains on the already-weak  financial sector. As a conse- 
quence, a significant  number  of banks found themselves without suffi- 
cient resources to meet their payment obligations  .  .  .  . The authorities, 
and market  participants,  soon realized that the banking system could 
not bear this stress for long."  Eventually, the central bank had to 
provide emergency  liquidity financing, and the rupiah  had again fallen 
under  significant  pressure  by the end of September.  The idea that high 
interest  rates  could stop the panic  essentially had  been tested and  proved 
incorrect  before the start  up of the IMF program.46 
45.  Kindleberger  (1996, p. 8). 
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Yet the same strategy was pursued in the formal IMF program 
launched  on November 1. It was alleged that the combination  of tight 
monetary policy and "decisive  actions to address the fundamental 
weaknesses of the economy" would solve the problem. Once again, 
the higher  interest  rates  had little positive effect, however. Indonesia's 
second letter of intent, quoted above, notes that although interbank 
rates were raised to over 30 percent in early December, the problems 
with the rupiah  intensified. 
A fifth important  reason for the failure of the IMF programs  is that 
the loan packages provided only a weak shadow of a lender of last 
resort  facility. While we are not enthusiastic  about  casting the IMF as 
a true international  lender  of last resort  (see below), we would empha- 
size that announcing  large sums of money that are not readily available 
for short-term  support  is unlikely to stop a creditor  run. 
Under the IMF programs  in East Asia, it is not clear how much 
money is actually available to each country:  substantial  sums are an- 
nounced  as contingency  funding  from bilateral  supporters,  but the con- 
ditions for their use are not defined and are subject  to future  IMF staff 
appraisals  and  negotiations  with the bilateral  creditors.  Turning  back to 
table 15, we try  to assess the money that  is really  in hand.  Commitments 
were made as first  and second lines of defense. The first  line of defense 
consisted of funding from the IMF, the World  Bank, the Asian Devel- 
opment  Bank  (ADB), and  in the case of Thailand,  from  bilateral  donors. 
The loan packages commit to provide funding for three years, and the 
money is tranched-that is, available  only in "slices" over the program 
period. Moreover, funding  from the World  Bank and the ADB is pred- 
icated on the negotiation of separate agreements  related to financial 
markets, social policy, and other substantive  areas. By the end of De- 
cember 1997, in Thailand, $7.3 billion of the original $17.2 billion in 
commitments  had been disbursed.  In Korea, $13.2 billion of the $57.0 
billion committed  had been disbursed, largely as a result of the emer- 
gency acceleration of disbursements  on December 24.  None of the 
second line funding had been disbursed  in Korea by the end of March 
1998. In Indonesia, only $3 billion of the promised $40 billion had 
been disbursed  by the end of March 1998, and this did not include any 
money from the World Bank, the ADB, or the bilateral second line 
donors. The amounts  of money that  were disbursed  in each country  are 
very small, compared  with the short-term  debts falling due. Unlike a Steven Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs  67 
true lender of last resort, which provides the full amount (L =  OD) 
needed for debt servicing, the IMF put only a small proportion  of that 
funding directly on offer through  its loan packages. 
When one examines the IMF programs  with care, one can see that 
they were predicated  on the very optimistic assumption  that short-term 
debt would be rolled over. For Indonesia, for example, the baseline 
program  projected the voluntary rollover of  short-term  debt at two- 
thirds  of the amount  falling due.47  The baseline assumptions  for Korea 
and Thailand  were even more optimistic. The Thai program  assumed 
that "short-term  lines to Thai banks ($11 billion, much of which have 
been undertaken  by the five largest)  will also be broadly  maintained.  "48 
In the case of Korea, the IMF's working  assumption  was "that, on the 
basis of the beneficial effects on market  confidence of the announced 
program  and the large financing package, the bulk of the short-term 
debt [would] be rolled over."49  While these programs  did include pro- 
visions for contingencies, these could only be triggered  as extraordinary 
events. And in fact on December 24,  1997, after considerable  public 
hand-wringing  by U.S.  and Korean  officials, $10 billion of the second 
line of defense funding was activated in Korea. Under such circum- 
stances, the lender of last resort  effect is not really secured. Creditors 
essentially still face a one-way bet: either to leave their money in the 
country,  with a real risk of imminent  default  or forced  rollover-which 
is what  happened  in Korea-or  to take  it out at little cost, to see whether 
enough contingent  funds will indeed be made available. 
In two other regards, the IMF programs  in East Asia are far from 
optimal for restoring financial market confidence in the short term. 
First, they have covered a very wide range of policies beyond the 
immediate  financial  crisis, including trade  liberalization,  demonopoli- 
zation, privatization,  and so forth. Such reforms  may well be desirable, 
and some-for  example, eliminating  monopolies that effectively have 
open lines of credit with the commercial banks-may  be germane to 
strengthening  the weak banking  sector. Most of the structural  reforms, 
however, simply distract  attention  from the financial  crisis. They have 
taken government expertise, negotiating time, and political capital 
47.  International  Monetary  Fund  (1997a, p. 22). 
48.  International  Monetary  Fund  (1997d, p. 12). 
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away from the core issues of financial  markets, exchange rate policy, 
and the like.S? 
Second, the initial loan programs  were not released to the public. 
This secrecy, a traditional  feature of IMF loan agreements, proved a 
major  liability in the Asian context, since the programs  aimed in large 
part to restore public confidence in the short term. Fortunately, the 
second round  of programs  have been made  public;  since February  1998, 
they have even been posted at the IMF's worldwide  web site. 
An Evolving  Framework for  1998 
The East Asian financial crisis will take a very serious toll on the 
region's economies in 1998. The depth of the crisis, however, is still 
to be determined.  Though  Asian financial  markets  have begun to regain 
strength  in early 1998, the real effects of the reversal of credit flows 
have yet to be felt. The effective time-outs on debt servicing in Korea 
and Indonesia-the  former  by negotiation, the latter  by default-have 
given some breathing  space for longer term solutions. Several urgent 
issues remain  to be addressed. 
The overhang of short-term  debt will continue to plague all three 
major  crisis economies. Korea's time-out  lasts until the end of the first 
quarter  of 1998, and considerable  amounts  of short-term  debt remain 
to be paid during  the remainder  of the year. In April, however, Korea 
was able to return  to the markets  and effectively refinance  some debt 
payments with a new bond issue of $4 billion.5' Indonesia has yet to 
negotiate a formal rollover or standstill  on debt payments, and a large 
proportion  of its corporate  external  debt is now in outright  default. The 
experiences of Mexico and Argentina  suggest that bank creditors are 
likely to continue  to demand  repayment  of short-term  debts as they fall 
due, even if new foreign investors begin to enter these economies. 
There is a reasonable  chance that all three economies will need a 
further  stretching  out of debt payments for the remainder  of 1998. If 
there is a renewed significant  net outflow of funds, debt restructuring 
50.  See Feldstein  (1998) for a critique  of IMF programs  along these lines. 
51.  On April 8,  1998, Korea  sold $1 billion in five-year  government  notes (at 335 
basis points over the London  interbank  offer rate [LIBOR])  and $3 billion in ten-year 
notes (at 345 basis points over LIBOR).  The issue was reportedly  substantially  oversub- 
scribed, and the government  immediately  initiated  plans for another  offering, pending 
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should be carried  out in an orderly  manner,  without  desperate  measures 
to avoid another round of negotiation. There is no justification, for 
example, for boosting interest  rates yet again in order  to forestall con- 
certed rollovers of  short-term  debts. Furthermore,  the IMF and the 
Asian countries should insist on restructuring  the debt, rather than 
drawing  down IMF  funds. Not only do concerted  workout  arrangements 
introduce  much less moral hazard  in rescue operations, but as we dis- 
cuss below, there  are  far more  effective ways to use IMF  program  funds 
than simply to recycle them to international  creditors. 
The banking  sector remains  illiquid and heavily undercapitalized  in 
each of the crisis countries. Given that the banks are net borrowers 
from abroad, the sharp real depreciations  of these currencies almost 
surely has meant that a large proportion  of net worth has been wiped 
out. On paper, the banks  have generally tried to hedge their positions, 
keeping dollar-denominated  lending roughly in balance with dollar- 
denominated  borrowing.  Since much of that dollar lending has been to 
domestic investors that will face bankruptcy  in the wake of the sharp 
exchange rate depreciations,  however, even banks that are hedged on 
paper  will suffer a large loss of net worth. Not surprisingly,  the early 
evidence suggests that rates of nonperforming  loans are soaring. Even 
more  dangerous,  almost all nonforeign  commercial  banks  in Indonesia, 
and many in Thailand  and Korea, have been so sharply  downgraded  as 
credit risks that they are no longer able to open letters of credit recog- 
nized by international  banks. As noted above, Asian exporters have 
consequently  been facing a sharp  credit squeeze, which is preventing 
many of them from responding  to the huge rise in profitable  opportun- 
ities following the currency  depreciations. 
In the short term, a portion of the emergency IMF loans could be 
used to create  dedicated  pools of working  capital  to help finance  credits 
for exporters;  for example, by guaranteeing  letters of credit  opened by 
commercial banks. In the medium term, the commercial banks will 
have to be recapitalized  and floated again to private investors. There 
are many possible models for bank rehabilitation.  Typically, they re- 
quire an infusion of public funds to reestablish  the positive net worth 
of insolvent banks; temporary  transfer  of ownership of the insolvent 
banks  to a public intermediary;  and  the resale of the banks  to the private 
sector, with both  foreign and  domestic  investors  invited  to provide  fresh 
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back the recent public guarantees  of bank deposits and liabilities. Part 
of the IMF loan program  could usefully be dedicated  to establishing a 
rudimentary  deposit insurance  fund, as a way to strengthen  public con- 
fidence in the banking  sector. 
In parallel with bank  restructuring  and capitalization,  enterprise  re- 
structuring  and capitalization  must take place in the nonfinancial  cor- 
porate sector. Each of the three crisis countries is in the process of 
establishing new bankruptcy  mechanisms  to facilitate financial  recon- 
struction  in the corporate  sector. This will include the widespread  con- 
version of debt to equity, and the transfer  of equity in insolvent enter- 
prises from existing shareholders  to creditors. 
Another  portion  of the IMF funds should provide the gross reserves 
needed to back more appreciated  exchange rates in these countries. 
Exchange rate targets failed in the second half of  1997 because they 
were overwhelmed  by panicked withdrawals  of loans. New exchange 
rate targets will be viable if accompanied  by realistic rescheduling  of 
the foreign debt obligations falling due in the year. There is little case 
for a return  to pegged exchange  rates, and  still less for the establishment 
of  currency boards. Nonetheless, the availability of  adequate gross 
reserves will surely help to establish greater  market  confidence, and 
thus might make it possible to nudge the real exchange rates of the 
Asian countries  toward  more realistic postpanic  levels. 
Preventing or Managing Future Crises 
Current arrangements  for integrating emerging markets into the 
global financial system are clearly defective. Capital market  liberali- 
zations in Latin  America, eastern  Europe, and  Asia have been followed 
by extreme  macroeconomic  crises. The IMF's responses  to those crises 
have not prevented  deep dislocations  in the emerging  market  countries. 
Moreover,  the emergency  IMF  bailout  packages  in Mexico, Argentina, 
and East Asia have arguably  contributed  to significant  new moral  haz- 
ards  in international  lending. The IMF has shown itself to be extremely 
fearful  of a default  in any major  emerging  market,  and  in fact, prepared 
to devote large sums of money to bailing out foreign credits. Deputy 
Treasury  Secretary  Lawrence  Summers  has described  the current  system 
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controlled  chaos  and confusion  on the one hand and large bailouts  on 
the other."'52 
We argue that international financial markets are inherently unstable, 
at least for countries borrowing heavily  from abroad at short maturities 
and in foreign currency. It may be true that better banking supervision 
would  solve  the problem  of  unstable  capital  markets,  although many 
advanced economies  have suffered enormous banking crises following 
financial market liberalization,  as did Sweden in the early 1990s.  Thus 
the rapid push toward fully open capital markets among the developing 
countries  would  seem  to  be  misguided.  There  is  certainly  no  strong 
empirical evidence  that economic  growth in middle-income  developing 
countries depends on unfettered access to short-term capital flows from 
abroad. Such short-term financing is useful for trade flows,  but not for 
longer term investments.  And short-term inflows  have still less  use in 
financing  long-term  on-lending  by highly  leveraged  financial  institu- 
tions.  The notion that improved supervision  will  quickly render short- 
term capital flows  benign is unproven-and  unlikely,  in our opinion. 
The  policy  goal  should  be  to  support  long-term  capital  flows- 
especially  foreign  direct investment-and  equity  portfolio  flows,  but 
mainly to limit short-term international flows to the financing of short- 
term trade transactions.  Banks and nonfinancial corporations could be 
discouraged from short-term international financing (with maturities of 
under six  months,  for example),  except  to finance documented  trade 
transactions. One could approach such limits through taxation-as  does 
Chile,  which  imposes  a 30  percent reserve  requirement on dollar de- 
posits  in the banking system-or  through outright supervisory  limits. 
Practical enforcement considerations,  such as administration and mon- 
itoring,  would  probably  push  toward  outright  quantitative  limits  on 
short-term flows,  even  though  economic  arguments would  generally 
favor taxation.  The argument that short-term flows  essentially  cannot 
be controlled,  because  of poor monitoring or access  to financial deriv- 
atives  that allow  controls  to be circumvented,  is not convincing.  The 
huge buildup of short-term debts in Asia in the 1990s followed  hard on 
the heels  of a specific  set of financial liberalization  actions.  It is fair to 
contend that without institutional innovations such as the Bangkok Inter- 
52.  Lawrence  Summers, "Go with the Flow," Financial Times, March 11, 1998, 
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national  Banking  Facility, the Thai buildup  of debt  could well have been 
contained.  Similarly,  the buildup  of short-term  debt in Korea  was a con- 
sequence of the regulatory  treatment  of Korean  merchant  banks in the 
mid-1990s. Some short-term  capital will always evade any taxation  or 
quantitative  controls,  but the evidence  from Chile and  Malaysia  suggests 
that  such tools can be effective at slowing such inflows  on the margin. 
Ironically, the IMF has been pushing the Asian countries toward 
accelerated  capital market  liberalization  in the wake of the crisis. For 
example, the December 3,  1997, program  for Korea announces that 
"the government  plans to accelerate substantially  its ongoing capital 
account liberalization.  .  .  . In order to instill market discipline  a time- 
table will  be set by end-February  1998 to eliminate restrictions on 
foreign borrowing  by corporations,"  among  other  measures.  Accord- 
ing to our analysis, such a push toward  further  liberalization  of long- 
term  capital flows, including  foreign direct  investment,  has little risk- 
and probably significant long-term economic benefit. The problems 
arise mainly from the lack of any distinction between short-term  and 
long-term  capital flows. 
While the liberalization  of short-term  capital movements should be 
undertaken  only gradually  and  with extreme  caution, opening  the finan- 
cial sector to foreign direct investment  should probably  be much more 
rapid and forthright.  When the crisis erupted, Indonesia, Korea, Ma- 
laysia, and Thailand  were all characterized  by the limited presence of 
foreign bank branches  and subsidiaries.  Despite their significant  inter- 
est,  foreign banks were generally unable to obtain general banking 
licenses, due to protectionism  in support  of domestic banks. The pres- 
ence of more foreign banks would almost surely have helped to calm 
the Asian financial  crisis, for several reasons. First, branches  of major 
international  banks would have been much less subject to depositor 
panics than  were domestic banks;  indeed, in Indonesia, depositors  fled 
from the national banks to the few foreign banks, and also to state- 
owned banks. Second, foreign banks would have been less likely to 
withdraw their own loans to local customers than to withdraw their 
cross-border  credits to Asian banks. Third, they would have raised the 
general  level of competition  in the banking  system and  might  well have 
helped to limit the politicization of bank ownership  and bank lending. 
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We also argue that the IMF's bailout lending has been ineffective, 
probably  intrinsically  so. The IMF is unable to be a true lender of last 
resort. Its loans will always be sufficiently  restrictive,  conditional, and 
tranched  to leave lingering doubts in the markets, and therefore  leave 
room for "rational" panics. With the announcement  of an IMF loan 
package, short-term  claimants still have the preferred  option of with- 
drawing  their loans and waiting to see what will happen  in the future. 
The provision of IMF loans is therefore  unlikely to staunch  a panicked 
outflow of loan capital. The result  may be the worst of both worlds. On 
the one hand, the panic continues, with adverse macroeconomic  con- 
sequences. On the other  hand, the foreign lending is socialized (that  is, 
repaid by the public sector), with objectionable  distributional  conse- 
quences, since the foreign banks get bailed out at the expense of the 
taxpayers  of the emerging  markets,  and  deep problems  of moral  hazard. 
The Korean episode points to a better approach:  orderly workout 
arrangements  that rely on private sector funds rather  than on bailout 
loans from the IMF.54 The analytical  starting  point for this approach  is 
the recognition  that chapter 11-style bankruptcies  in the United States 
(or chapter  9, in the case of municipalities)  create a negotiating  frame- 
work for creditors  and debtors that overcomes many of the collective 
action  problems  inherent  in financial  crises. A bankruptcy  arrangement 
typically involves a standstill  on debt servicing, such as that in Korea 
in the first quarter  of 1998; an arrangement  for tapping  private  capital 
markets  for interim financing-so-called  debtor-in-possession  financ- 
ing, under  section 364 of the U.S. Bankruptcy  Code; and a system for 
debt reduction  and debt-to-equity  conversion that overcomes the inev- 
itable free-riding  among creditors  in the course of debt restructurings. 
The provision for debtor-in-possession  financing is critical. Under 
bankruptcy  law, the general  idea is that  the bankruptcy  court  can enable 
the bankrupt  debtor  to tap the private  capital  markets  by granting  priority 
in the repayment  queue  to the new loans. In our  context,  it would  be as if 
Korea  could have gone to the Eurobond  markets  in December  1997 with 
the enforceable  legal right to borrow  fresh loans that would be repaid 
ahead  of all of the existing credits. In this way, the bankruptcy  court  is 
able  to get working  capital  to the bankrupt  debtor,  despite  the fact that  the 
court  (in contrast  to the IMF)  cannot  tap official funding  sources. 
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International workout arrangements could be modeled on the chapter 
11  process.  When  a  sovereign  borrower  faced  imminent  default,  a 
standstill  on debt servicing  would  be triggered (and perhaps officially 
approved by the IMF's  Executive  Board).  The  debtor country would 
fall under the protection of the IMF, which would facilitate negotiations 
between the debtor and private sector creditors to restructure the repay- 
ment  program.  The  plan would  be  conditioned  on  economic  reform 
measures  agreed by the debtor country.  The IMF would  also facilitate 
interim financing,  not by directly making available  official  funds,  but 
rather by overseeing  new priority borrowing by the debtor country.  In 
this way,  the debtor country would  be able to tap the capital markets 
despite the standstill on repayments of the earlier debt. A candidate for 
this type of arrangement would have been Mexico  in 1995. 
When there is a mass exodus  from private sector debtors,  as in the 
East Asian crisis countries,  the situation is much more complex.  Under 
those  circumstances,  the  individual  bankruptcy model  applied  on  a 
case-by-case  basis  will  not resolve  a financial  panic  in  a timely  and 
efficient way. It may still be necessary to impose a generalized standstill 
on debt servicing,  followed  by a mechanism to bring the various inter- 
national creditors and national debtors under one roof for a collective 
renegotiation  and rollover  of  debts-just  as occurred in Korea in late 
December  1997  and early  January  1998.  Thus  designers  of  orderly 
workout mechanisms  might have to contemplate provisions  for across- 
the-board standstills  and rollovers  of  debts at the country level,  even 
though the debts are in fact owed by individual private sector entities. 
The IMF's Interim Committee acknowledged  the need to "involve  pri- 
vate  creditors  at an early  stage,  in order to achieve  equitable  burden 
sharing vis-'a-vis the official  sector and to limit moral hazard."55 
The Korean negotiations  demonstrated that such a mechanism  can 
work in practice.  Now,  we  suppose,  economists  will  have to discover 
whether it can work in theory-and  thereby be pursued more system- 
atically in future cases.  The better hope remains that prudential restric- 
tions  on short-term capital  flows  and greater market sensitivity  to the 
risk of panic will  render the need for such extraordinary interventions 
much less  likely,  by limiting  the buildup of unstable short-term debts 
before a crisis  occurs. 
55.  International  Monetary  Fund  (1998a, sect. 3[e]). Comments 
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Richard  N.  Cooper:  This  paper offers  a useful,  comprehensive  dis- 
cussion  of  the East Asian  financial crises.  I emphasize  the plural be- 
cause,  in my judgment,  what occurred in the second half of  1997 was 
not a single crisis; it was a series of crises,  not completely  unrelated to 
one another. But if one looks under the rug, the details differ in impor- 
tant ways  from one country to another. 
Stephen Radelet  and Jeffrey  Sachs emphasize  that, among the var- 
ious types of crisis,  these were overwhelmingly  financial panics calling 
for remedies  very  different  from those  for  a normal financial  crisis. 
They consequently  blame the International Monetary Fund for not help- 
ing,  and in some respects actually aggravating,  the crises.  The authors 
have the advantage of  hindsight: they are in the luxurious position  of 
engaging  in Monday morning quarterbacking. The relevant question is 
not  whether  the  IMF  made  mistakes-it  surely  did-but  whether  it 
made mistakes ex ante, given  what it could have known at the time. 
Indeed,  the authors emphasize  how little these crises  were actually 
forecast.  The following  assessment  appeared in a highly  reputable fi- 
nancial newsletter published by the Chase Manhattan Bank on October 
1,  1997,  three months  after the crisis  in Thailand had erupted and in 
the  face  of  substantial  declines  in  stock  prices  as  well  as  currency 
depreciation: 
The weakening  of the other Asian currencies  is less a result of "conta- 
gion" than a reaction by investors-and  policymakers-to  new facts. 
That said, economic fundamentals  and policy management  are stronger 
in the other Southeast  Asian nations, which will experience  both a more 
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moderate  decline in growth this year and a more rapid rebound than 
Thailand  next year. As the foreign exchange market  begins to stabilize, 
these differences in performance  and policy will be reflected in each 
country's  currency.I 
That is a relatively  complacent,  but fairly typical,  statement. It contin- 
ues:  "growth  [in Korea] will  slow  in any case because  of the restruc- 
turing of major industrial conglomerates  (chaebol),  weak domestic  de- 
mand,  and problems in the banking system.  Overall,  Asian  growth is 
expected  to decline  by about two  percentage  points next year,  to 61/2 
percent."  The sharp declines  experienced  after mid-October were not 
foreseen  by mainline  financial analysts. 
Radelet and Sachs identify  four key elements  of the IMF programs: 
fiscal  policy,  monetary policy,  bank closings,  and the rebuilding  and 
recapitalization  of banks. They argue that all were misguided.  Here, I 
discuss  these  elements  in  an ex  ante sense  rather than in an ex  post 
sense.  I disagree with the authors on the first two but I agree with them 
on the last two. 
Let me address fiscal policy.  I focus  on Thailand,  because  that was 
the first crisis and called for the largest fiscal contraction. In its support 
program of  August  1997,  the IMF required a country that had nearly 
balanced fiscal accounts to achieve a surplus of 3 percent of GDP. Some 
observers  thought  that the  IMF  was  applying  its  usual  prescription 
inappropriately. 
It should  be  kept  in  mind,  however,  that Thailand  had a current 
account  deficit  of  8 percent of  GDP in a period when,  as the authors 
emphasize,  private capital inflows  were drying up. The Thais did not 
disagree that they needed a substantial reduction in their current account 
deficit.  Economists  do not know how to manipulate private saving.  The 
one way we know of manipulating national saving,  more or less  relia- 
bly,  is through the fiscal  accounts.  The fiscal tightening  in Thailand, 
following  a substantial depreciation of the currency, represents a com- 
bination of  expenditure  switching  toward net exports and a necessary 
reduction in domestic  expenditure.  That is standard prescription under 
the circumstances  and is not obviously  inappropriate. 
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The IMF's  fiscal  target for Thailand was predicated on a 3 percent 
growth rate in 1998. That raises an interesting question about how these 
loan programs are put together.  The  "letter  of  intent"  is  technically 
written from the country in question to the IMF. To its credit, Thailand 
makes its intent public; not all countries do.  In August  1997 the Thai 
authorities did not want to admit publicly  that they foresaw  a growth 
rate below  3 percent, already a substantial reduction from that of 1996. 
What does  the IMF do under such circumstances?  In this case,  it set 
the fiscal  target in accordance  with  a projected  growth rate which  at 
least some of its own analysts knew to be wrong. 
It is standard procedure for the IMF to review its programs quarterly 
to assess progress and make adjustments in light of new circumstances. 
At the  first quarterly review,  and then again  at the  second,  the IMF 
essentially  held Thailand to the expenditure levels  and tax rates of the 
original  program,  recognizing  that the  country  would  not  achieve  a 
budgetary surplus exceeding  2 percent of GDP.  In other words,  it al- 
lowed  the fiscal  stabilizer to work.  One may differ in one's  judgment 
about these matters, but that does not strike me as an obviously  wrong 
approach,  given  what the Thai  and the IMF authorities knew  during 
August,  when the program was agreed. 
In contrast to  the  issue  of  fiscal  policy,  I agree  with  Radelet  and 
Sachs on the question of bank closings  and bank recapitalization.  Both 
were clearly required. But it is highly risky to announce in advance that 
certain banks are going to be closed,  without having in place a program 
to reassure depositors  about the  security  of  their deposits  and of  the 
survival of the remaining banks.  Moreover,  high capital requirements 
for banks are intended to provide a cushion  against unforeseen  contin- 
gencies,  as a shock absorber between  assets  and liabilities.  It gets the 
matter backward to require that banks recapitalize  as a precondition for 
dealing with a financial emergency.  While they do have to recapitalize, 
to require that they do so in the first months of the program can aggra- 
vate rather than mitigate the problem. 
The  East  Asian  financial  crises  are complex,  and the lessons  that 
people draw will depend on what they bring with them. It is not entirely 
surprising  that Jeffrey  Sachs  finds  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
deeply deficient.  It will be equally unsurprising if members of the Cato 
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the superiority  of Anglo-Saxon capitalism  over Asian capitalism  (what 
is now loosely called crony capitalism). But that is not the lesson that 
will be drawn  in Asia. 
Officials in China and Vietnam-countries  at different stages of 
economic reform-will  be reinforced  in their  caution  about  the pace of 
liberalization. Unhappily, Vietnam may even bring reform to a com- 
plete halt for a while. Meanwhile, China has postponed  full currency 
convertibility, which was originally targeted  for the year 2000, until 
well into the next century. In Thailand and Korea, some people will 
discover in these crises evidence that democratization  was a serious 
mistake, and they will hanker  after the strong  man days of Sarit  Than- 
arat  in Thailand  and Park  Chung  Hee in Korea. 
One must be careful about overdrawing  conclusions. Having said 
that, I believe that  these crises underscore  four  fundamental  points. The 
first, aimed mainly at economists, is that the financial  system is a part 
of the fundamentals  of every modern  economy. It is a mistake  to draw 
a sharp  distinction, as economists routinely do, between the real and 
the monetary  economy. This dichotomy has been so productive  peda- 
gogically that  we focus too often only on real variables  and neglect the 
financial system that lubricates  them. We simply assume perfect arbi- 
trage and implicitly dismiss the resources required  to make it work. 
This relative neglect is all the more curious, in that in the American 
economy the financial sector generates nearly 6 percent of total em- 
ployment, far more than the agricultural  sector. In focusing on an 
economy's fundamentals,  therefore, one should recognize that these 
include both the magnitude  and the quality of its financial  sector. 
Second, 1997 revealed perhaps not a clash of civilizations, but a 
clash of cultures  played  out in the financial  world. Foreign  lenders  based 
in London, New York, and other major  financial  centers expect to be 
kept well informed  about  what is happening  in the economies to which 
they lend, and especially about  what is happening  to the borrowers.  If 
borrowers  are unexpectedly  unable  to repay  on schedule, these lenders 
expect orderly  procedures  for working  out the situation,  preferably  ones 
that maximize the likelihood of being paid without loss. In short, they 
expect transparency  and well-defined processes. 
Asian borrowers  have a different tradition, which emphasizes per- 
sonal-and  political-connections  and loyalties. They operate  on the 
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doors.  What foreign  lenders  or domestic  depositors  do not know  will 
not  hurt them;  indeed,  timely  and accurate  information  may  unduly 
alarm them.  It should be noted that the Asian tradition,  or something 
resembling  it,  was common  in many European countries not long  ago 
and its remnants are discernable  even today. 
It is difficult to pass judgment on the respective  merits of these two 
quite different traditions.  One can find circumstances  in which  one or 
the other is superior, but my main point is that they do not mix well.  If 
foreign  lenders  suspect  that serious  problems  are likely  to arise with 
their Asian  borrowers,  they do not expect  to be told how  serious  the 
problems may become and what the likely  solutions will be. But neither 
do  they  expect  to  be  treated equitably  in  the  solutions  that may  be 
worked  out behind  closed  doors.  So  they  will  simply  withdraw their 
funds as rapidly as they can,  thus turning a financial problem,  or even 
a suspected  financial problem,  into a financial rout. 
Third,  the  high-growth  East  Asian  countries  have  been  widely 
praised for their high saving  rates,  which  permit high rates of  invest- 
ment even without the inflow of foreign capital.  Household  savings  in 
this  part of  the world  were  traditionally  held  in the form of  gold  or 
silver  jewelry,  coins,  leaves,  or bars.  During  the  past  two  or three 
decades,  however,  ordinary people  have  increasingly  entrusted their 
savings to deposit-taking  institutions,  which,  in turn, have been able to 
mobilize  the  savings  for  investment  elsewhere  in  the economy.  But 
such deposits  involve  an act of trust by the public at large.  There is a 
corresponding  obligation  on the authorities to ensure that this trust is 
warranted and preserved. 
The sad fact is that the public's  trust has been badly abused in many 
Asian  countries,  including  some  that have  not been caught up in the 
crisis,  most notably China.  Banks have used the deposits  of  ordinary 
people  to make loans ranging from unrecoverable  operating subsidies 
to favored enterprises to high-stakes  gambles  in urban real estate.  One 
of the most important tasks of the monetary authorities in Asian coun- 
tries is to rebuild the trust that has been eroded and to preserve it. 
Fourth, the crises  serve as a reminder that modern financial systems 
are intrinsically  unstable.  In their normal domestic  operations,  banks 
engage  in maturity transformation,  borrowing short and lending  long. 
With the globalization  of capital markets, they increasingly engage also 
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and they  rely  very  much  on  the  independence  of  large  numbers  of 
transactions to reduce the risk through diversification.  Some,  but not 
all, of the risk can be spread through skillful use of financial derivatives, 
although new risks,  often  not so evident,  are thereby introduced.  But 
when the independence  of transactions disappears,  as it does when the 
herd behavior of lenders takes over, possibly  leading to stampedes,  the 
underlying fragility  of the financial system  is revealed. 
These are characteristics of all financial markets. In developed  coun- 
tries, years of often unpleasant experience  have led to the construction 
of  an elaborate structure to bound,  bolster,  and, if necessary,  support 
the  financial  system  against  the  worst  consequences  of  its  intrinsic 
instability.  Elements of this structure include deposit insurance, capital 
requirements for deposit-taking  banks and brokers, independent audit- 
ing, risk limitations (for example,  on foreign currency exposure),  close 
supervision,  and a lender  of  last  resort.  It takes  time,  training,  and 
experience  to develop  such comprehensive  regulatory structures. They 
are only nascent in many low-income  countries and at the international 
level. 
Sadly,  most societies  find it difficult to learn from the experience  of 
others-they  learn mainly from their own mistakes.  From this point of 
view,  the  1997  crises  may have  been  necessary  steps  in the learning 
process  of  rapidly  developing  economies.  If  the lessons  are learned 
well,  these  countries  will  emerge  the  stronger for them,  after a few 
years of economic pain. For its part, the international community should 
be spurred to work more aggressively  toward developing  internationally 
acceptable banking standards, and to ensure that it can provide financial 
support quickly  and in sufficient  magnitude when the need arises. 
Barry  P. Bosworth:  In this broad-ranging paper,  Radelet  and Sachs 
relate the East Asian  financial crisis  to a large prior literature on the 
causes of such crises and the policy  responses.  The discussion  is struc- 
tured around three primary issues:  the causes  of the crisis,  the appro- 
priateness of the IMF response,  and long-term crisis prevention. 
The largest portion of the paper is devoted to the causes of the crisis. 
Historically,  the debate has been divided  between  those  who  see  cur- 
rency  crises  as  the result  of  deterioration  in  economic  fundamentals 
within the affected countries ("it was their fault")  and those who blame 
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prophecies). Radelet and Sachs provide a slightly different focus by 
distinguishing  among internal  fundamentals,  external  shocks, and sys- 
temic instability. However, the adverse external shocks that they can 
identify seem at best minor contributors  to the crises. As they point 
out, the loss of trade  shares  to Mexico and China  was small. And there 
is little evidence of seriously overvalued  exchange  rates. For example, 
the Korean  won was devalued by 15 percent  in nominal  terms  relative 
to the dollar between the end of  1995 and March 1997,  and most 
measures  of real exchange  rates  show very little appreciation  on a trade- 
weighted basis. The one external  factor that  the authors  do not empha- 
size is the role of Japan. Were not the incredible low interest  rates in 
Japan a contributing  factor? The fact that banks could raise deposit 
funds with a 1 percent deposit rate in Japan  and lend at 10 percent in 
Korea must have been a significant inducement to the expansion of 
capital inflows. 
Radelet and Sachs argue that the Asian crisis should be interpreted 
as an  unforeseeable  financial  panic  that  cannot  be traced  to deteriorating 
fundamentals.  With hindsight, economists can always unearth some 
policy errors, but I think that the authors  are on the right side of this 
debate. The lack of evidence of significant  foresight in markets  or of 
strong  contagion  effects argues  strongly  for the self-fulfilling prophesy 
interpretation.  In fact, most of the macroeconomic  fundamentals  looked 
quite good: low inflation, fiscal surpluses  or small deficits, high rates 
of capital  formation,  and  rapid  growth. Although  the Asian crisis coun- 
tries had surprisingly  large current  account  deficits, the capital inflows 
were associated  with high investment, not consumption  as in Mexico. 
If the disaster  was due to policy error  everyone is vulnerable, because 
the mistakes were certainly small and within the range of those com- 
mitted by the industrialized  countries. 
The new focus in this paper  is on weak banking  systems. But these 
Asian countries were not unique in the low quality of their banking 
systems, at least as measured  by rating services such as Moody's and 
Standard  and Poor's. It was not so long ago that the development of 
extensive financial  intermediation  was being cited in the economic lit- 
erature  as a significant  contributor  to Asia's rapid  growth. It is striking 
how quickly one can convert a positive into a negative. Furthermore,  a 
heavy reliance on debt finance is often associated with high growth, 
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enterprises.  Equity  markets are not frequently  a significant  source  of 
new funds. 
Even if bad banks posed  a major problem,  something  else  needs  to 
be added to the mix in order to induce a crisis-capital  convertibility. 
Both Thailand and Korea were faced with strong international pressure 
to open their financial markets to foreign  investors,  and in retrospect, 
the process  was  badly  mismanaged.  The  industrial countries  and the 
international institutions have made capital convertibility  a high priority 
for  many  developing  economies.  However,  the  process  of  financial 
market reform is difficult,  and the introduction of capital account con- 
vertibility  in the early  stages  often  leads  to crisis.  Ronald McKinnon 
and others  have  stressed  the  importance  of  getting  the  sequence  of 
financial  reforms  right,  holding  off  on capital  convertibility  until  an 
open,  well-functioning  domestic  financial  system  is  in  place.  Those 
countries that were moving more slowly  to open their financial markets 
had far fewer problems; Taiwan,  for example,  had no capital convert- 
ibility  and no crisis. 
Much  of  what  Radelet  and Sachs  describe  is  very  reminiscent  of 
prior liquidity  crises  in industrialized  countries  and of  old-fashioned 
bank runs.  In particular, these  Asian  economies  stand out for having 
incredibly  low  reserves  relative  to  short-term liabilities;  and  in  the 
empirical  analysis,  that  is  the  only  variable  with  major  predictive 
power.  Many of the reported reserves were either not available (Korea) 
or offset  by large net positions  in the forward market (Thailand). While 
the  overall  external  debt of  the  Asian  crisis  countries  may  not  have 
been  excessive,  the proportion in  short-term liabilities  was  certainly 
extreme.  But not  only  banks were  exposed  to  currency  fluctuations. 
Because  of  a strong  government  commitment  to  relatively  fixed  ex- 
change rates,  many traders, including  large American export corpora- 
tions,  maintained substantial open positions.  The break in the exchange 
rate initiated  a rush to  cover  that exposure  that greatly  added to  the 
demands for foreign  exchange.  Thus,  while  these countries  may have 
faced some solvency  problems in the internal economy,  the fundamental 
external problem was liquidity. 
The authors note the similarities between the recent Asian crises and 
the Mexican  crisis  of  1994-95,  but the differences  in the international 
response  are striking.  Mexico  was  provided with  $52  billion  in loans 
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a few  weeks,  stopped  the crisis,  and by  the  middle  of  the  year had 
started repaying the United  States and Canada. The United  States has 
been fully repaid and netted a healthy profit. 
In contrast,  the  funds  offered  to  the  Asian  countries  were  highly 
conditional,  and the amounts actually made available were far less than 
the $100 billion prominently reported in the press. From the beginning, 
the IMF treated the crisis as involving  fundamental issues  of solvency, 
not liquidity.  Moreover,  it used  the crisis  to force  these  countries  to 
adopt its own  agenda for financial market reform. The IMF may have 
been  right  about the  need  for  the  banking  reforms,  but Radelet  and 
Sachs are correct in suggesting  that these should not have been initiated 
in the midst of  a financial crisis.  In retrospect,  it does  appear that the 
IMF program worsened  the situation in Indonesia,  and the initial pro- 
gram for Korea failed to deal with the overhang of maturing short-term 
foreign  currency  loans  Some  of  the  other reform  measures,  such  as 
changes in labor market regulations,  seem far removed from a currency 
crisis. 
The authors are also critical of the IMF's restrictive targets for fiscal 
and monetary policy.  Certainly,  such measures would have never been 
adopted in the United  States,  and they do remind one of the mistaken 
response to the Depression  of the early  1930s.  At least with respect to 
monetary policy,  though, the affected countries are caught in a difficult 
choice.  On the one  hand,  higher interest rates are beneficial  because 
they attract foreign currency; on the other hand, increased interest pay- 
ments inflict  an added burden on domestic  enterprises.  The emphasis 
on  fiscal  restraint is  more  difficult  to rationalize.  In effect,  the IMF 
used a liquidity crisis  to push an agenda of structural reform, whereas 
the first priority should have been to stop the panic.  The IMF viewed 
the  situation  of  these  economies  as no  different  from  the  traditional 
balance  of  payments  crisis,  in  which  a country  is  living  beyond  its 
means and is faced with the need to cut back domestic  demand. 
I believe  that the authors could have done more to address the longer 
term issue of systemic  reform. One big lesson  for the other developing 
countries is that there is not going  to be an international lender of last 
resort and they must develop  a more defensive  strategy of their own.  I 
think that translates into a policy  much closer to Chile's  restrictions on 
short-term liabilities  than the open  market advice  of the IMF and the 
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providing financial support  for each other, and they are not interested 
in providing additional  resources  to bail out developing countries. 
I am troubled  by the authors'  emphasis  on orderly  workouts,  because 
it appears  inconsistent with the emphasis in the first part of the paper 
on liquidity as opposed to solvency. Nor do I understand  the focus on 
bank lending. To some extent, the banks are simply the investors left 
behind  when everyone else heads for the exits. Suppose  that  the Korean 
banks  had issued commercial  paper  instead  of borrowing  from banks  in 
Japan, Europe, and the United States. The debt would be equally dif- 
ficult  to roll over, but  it would have been harder  to identify  who balked. 
All the current  talk of forcing banks to take a larger hit is simply a 
means of discouraging  future cross-border  bank lending, which Chile 
accomplishes with an extra reserve requirement.  However, Chile has 
concluded  that  the problem  lies not in the instrument  but in the maturity 
of the claim. Thus Chile limits short-term  capital  inflows, not  just bank 
loans. There are also major  questions about the appropriate  degree of 
reliance on banks versus financial  markets  in a world of international 
capital flows. Previously, it was argued  that  banks  provide  more effec- 
tive means of processing  information  about  borrowers,  but markets  are 
more effective in spreading  risks. 
Holding larger reserves is not an attractive  option, because it calls 
into question the value of open capital markets.  What is the benefit of 
capital inflows if the government  must set aside a substantial  portion 
for U.S. Treasury  bonds paying 3 percent?  With investor expectations 
of returns of  10 percent or more, this does not look like a paying 
proposition.  It is particularly  sad in the case of these Asian economies, 
because  they do not need the funds, given their  own high rates  of saving 
and capital formation. 
Finally, the East Asian crises seem to provide  further  evidence that 
fixed exchange rates are no longer feasible. Governments  should not 
promise something  that  they cannot  deliver, and  the effort to do so just 
breeds  instability. Increasingly,  the choice is between a single currency 
or flexible rates-the  middle option is disappearing. 
General discussion: Christopher  Sims questioned  the authors'  distinc- 
tion between liquidity problems and problems  with fundamentals.  He 
reasoned that a borrower  who was fundamentally  sound but had too 
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cover the short-term needs-he  cited the historical example  of Grover 
Cleveland's  repeated  issuance  of  long-term  debt  to  defend  the  gold 
value of the dollar. That the Asian nations could not do so is a sign that 
their problems  were  fundamental.  Robert  Hall  concurred  and asked 
why,  if the problem was  merely  one of  liquidity,  no private financier 
had stepped in to take advantage of the situation by arbitraging between 
long-  and short-term debt.  Sachs  responded  that the amounts needed 
for such an arbitrage operation were too big for a single  private insti- 
tution. The rapid downgrading of debt by international rating agencies 
also made it virtually  impossible  for lenders subject to fiduciary stan- 
dards to intervene and buy the debt. In the case of Mexico,  nobody had 
stepped in either.  Michael  Kremer suggested  that if the IMF's purpose 
was  to  allow  most  of  the  arbitrage gains  to  accrue to the borrowing 
country,  there would  not be  much room for the private  sector  to act 
ahead of the Fund. 
Sims suggested  that the correct definition of a fundamentals problem 
was  the  existence  of  a large  number of  contracts  that could  not  be 
delivered  on.  That the countries  in trouble resisted  devaluation  for so 
long because they feared the consequences  for the net worth of borrow- 
ers, had to be regarded as a fundamental problem. Sims also commented 
on the lack of movement in interest rates before the crisis.  He observed 
that lenders  who  were  sensitive  to  borrower-specific  risk  would  not 
offer to lend arbitrary amounts at a fixed rate, but rather would  quote 
schedules  of interest rates and quantities to borrowers. The absence of 
movements  in  interest  rates does  not  prove  that the crisis  was  com- 
pletely  unanticipated,  as  increased  risk  could  also  be  reflected  in  a 
shortening of maturities. Furthermore, it was not appropriate to use the 
amount of short-term borrowing as an exogenous  explanatory variable 
in regressions,  since a shift in the maturity of debt before the crisis was 
itself  endogenous. 
James Duesenberry reasoned that fixed exchange  rate regimes  were 
at the heart of the trouble, because they invited the large capital inflows 
that proved destabilizing.  The serious problems of bad domestic  bank- 
ing in Korea and Thailand added a vulnerability that created this specific 
crisis,  and even if there had been no borrowing from abroad, they would 
eventually  have created a domestic banking crisis.  Looking  ahead, this 
suggested  it was  important to slow  down  international capital  move- 
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Benjamin  Friedman  warned  that  even with better  procedures  for dealing 
with liquidity problems, including a lender of last resort, crises would 
occur  unless borrowers  and  lenders  had  strong  incentives  to worry  about 
risk management.  To provide the proper  incentives, it was important 
that  creditors  be allowed to lose money, as U.S. banks  did in the 1980s. 
William  Cline argued  that  the paper's  emphasis  on a short-term  crisis 
model downplayed  a variety  of fundamental  problems  that were appar- 
ent in the affected countries  prior  to the crisis. These included exces- 
sively rapid credit growth, overvalued fixed exchange rates, highly 
leveraged conglomerates,  grandiose  investment  projects, low levels of 
foreign direct investment, and the poor incentives provided by the 
Bangkok  interbank  facility. He also defended  the IMF against  many of 
the authors' criticisms. He argued  that its insistence on modest fiscal 
tightening  and significantly  higher  interest  rates in the Asian crisis sent 
a strong  signal that  these governments  were seriously  tackling  the prob- 
lems, providing benefits in confidence that could outweigh the direct 
contractionary  effects of fiscal restraint.  Furthermore,  he believed that 
higher interest  rates supported  exchange rates, and that the burden  for 
the economy from a lower exchange rate  could be more severe than  the 
burden from higher interest rates. In his view,  the most convincing 
criticism of the IMF in this episode was the timing of the banking 
cleanup, particularly  the closing of banks in Indonesia, which contrib- 
uted  to the bank  runs  there. He questioned  whether  major  debt  workouts 
would have been possible  without the implementation of an IMF 
package. 
Several participants  commented  on the problem  posed by short-term 
capital movements. Cline believed there  was a growing interest  in lim- 
iting short-term  capital buildups, but no consensus on whether this 
should  be done by individual  countries  or through  an international  man- 
date. Maurice Obstfeld was skeptical about the authorities'  ability to 
limit short-term  money flows, because financial  engineering  could dis- 
guise short-term  contracts  as long-term  contracts. Sachs thought  these 
worries exaggerated, observing that all the countries in question had 
functioning capital controls until the early 1990s. Cooper noted that 
any attempt  to limit flows would have to contend with the enormous 
growth of world interbank  markets  and the desire of emerging market 
banks  to participate  in it. He noted  that  when the Asian crisis hit, banks 
from that region called in loans to banks in other emerging markets, Steven  Radelet and Jeffrey D. Sachs  87 
thus creating  a risk that  the crisis might spread.  He added  that  portfolio 
equity investment  has also proven  to be highly liquid and mobile, even 
though it is conventionally  counted as long-term  capital. It adds vola- 
tility to stock prices and, if equities are  used as collateral  for borrowing, 
adds another source of credit risk. Michael Kremer  suggested that a 
microeconomic  externality  that could justify government  regulation  of 
short-term  borrowing  arose from the fact that when one firm is called 
to pay its external  debt, it drives down the currency, making it harder 
for other firms  to fulfill their obligations. 88  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
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